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Author SHA1 Message Date
Niels Lohmann 1c9475d68f Fix remaining CI failures in the huge-claimed-length DoS regression tests
- Apply the same google-readability-casting fix (std::size_t{N} instead
  of std::size_t(N)) to the "arrays of various sizes" section in
  unit-msgpack.cpp, unit-ubjson.cpp, and unit-bjdata.cpp; only
  unit-cbor.cpp had been fixed previously, since clang-tidy's build
  didn't get far enough to report the other three in the same pass.

- json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check calls JSON_THROW
  directly rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so unlike the
  scanner's own "not enough data" parse_error it is not gated by
  allow_exceptions=false. On a platform where a header's claimed count
  exceeds max_size() (e.g. 32-bit, for UBJSON/BJData's 0x7FFFFFFF test
  value), from_ubjson/from_bjdata(input, true, false) can therefore still
  throw instead of returning a discarded value. Make that assertion
  tolerant of either outcome, same as the main exception-catching check
  above it.

- Guard all four "a huge claimed length..." SECTIONs with
  #if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION), matching this test suite's existing
  convention for exception-dependent tests: under JSON_NOEXCEPTION,
  JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++ exception at all (it aborts
  the process), so a section that relies on try/catch to distinguish
  between two acceptable outcomes cannot be expressed under that build
  configuration regardless of platform.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-06 20:08:27 +02:00
Niels Lohmann 98ab9f31c3 Make the huge-claimed-length DoS regression tests portable across size_t widths
On a platform where size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g. 32-bit mingw/msvc
x86), the previously-hardcoded huge test lengths either collide with that
platform's unknown_size() sentinel (CBOR/MessagePack, both using exactly
SIZE_MAX) or exceed the platform's smaller vector<json>::max_size()
(UBJSON/BJData's 0x7FFFFFFF), so the header is now rejected outright
(out_of_range.408) instead of being accepted and only found short of data
(parse_error.110). Both are safe, bounded rejections of the hostile input;
the property under test -- no attempt to allocate space for billions of
elements -- holds either way. Accept both outcomes instead of pinning the
64-bit-only exact result.

Also fixed an unrelated clang-tidy finding (google-readability-casting) on
the functional-style std::size_t(...) casts in the neighboring "arrays of
various sizes" section.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-06 11:19:06 +02:00
Niels Lohmann aee9421883 Reserve capped array capacity for definite-length binary arrays
CBOR, MessagePack, and the optimized [$type#count UBJSON/BJData form all
pass an exact element count to sax->start_array(len), but
json_sax_dom_parser::start_array() (and the callback variant) only used
len for an overflow check against max_size() and never reserved the
underlying vector, so each element triggered a reallocation cascade via
emplace_back().

Reserve upfront, but cap the reservation at 16384 elements: max_size()
for a std::vector is far larger than any realistic input, so an
unbounded reserve(len) would let a crafted/truncated header (e.g. CBOR
0x9A + a huge uint32 count with no data) trigger a multi-gigabyte
allocation attempt instead of the normal graceful parse_error. With the
cap, a hostile length still fails fast with the existing parse_error,
while realistic arrays get a single up-front allocation.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-05 20:51:47 +02:00
10 changed files with 437 additions and 232 deletions
@@ -301,6 +301,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_parser
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
return true;
}
@@ -661,6 +671,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_callback_parser
{
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
}
return true;
+1 -61
View File
@@ -149,11 +149,10 @@ class lexer : public lexer_base<BasicJsonType>
public:
using token_type = typename lexer_base<BasicJsonType>::token_type;
explicit lexer(InputAdapterType&& adapter, bool ignore_comments_ = false, bool discard_number_values_ = false) noexcept
explicit lexer(InputAdapterType&& adapter, bool ignore_comments_ = false) noexcept
: ia(std::move(adapter))
, ignore_comments(ignore_comments_)
, decimal_point_char(static_cast<char_int_type>(get_decimal_point()))
, discard_number_values(discard_number_values_)
{}
// deleted because of pointer members
@@ -1280,58 +1279,6 @@ scan_number_done:
// we are done scanning a number)
unget();
// If the caller does not need the converted value (only whether the
// input is syntactically valid; see json_sax_acceptor/accept()), an
// unsigned/integer token can be reported without calling
// strtoull()/strtoll() at all, *provided* we can already tell from
// the digit count alone that the conversion cannot overflow 64 bits.
// Such tokens are always finite and are accepted unconditionally by
// the parser regardless of their actual value (parser::sax_parse_internal()
// never checks finiteness for value_unsigned/value_integer), so the
// classification below is all that is needed.
//
// A decimal number with up to 18 digits is always representable in
// both std::uint64_t and std::int64_t (18 nines is ~1e18, well below
// both UINT64_MAX ~1.8e19 and INT64_MAX ~9.2e18), so strtoull()/strtoll()
// could not have set errno to ERANGE for it. Numbers with more digits
// (rare in practice) fall through to the exact code below, unchanged,
// so their handling -- including reclassification to value_float when
// the value overflows 64 bits, and rejection when it is not even
// finite as a double -- is bit-for-bit identical to before this
// optimization.
//
// Note this reasons about std::uint64_t/std::int64_t, not about
// number_unsigned_t/number_integer_t (BasicJsonType's own, possibly
// narrower, template parameters -- e.g. std::uint32_t). That is fine
// *only* because discard_number_values is exclusively set by
// accept() (see json.hpp), and accept() always parses through the
// library's own json_sax_acceptor -- never a user-supplied SAX
// consumer -- whose number_unsigned()/number_integer()/number_float()
// callbacks unconditionally discard their argument and return true.
// So for every caller that can reach this branch, neither the token
// classification below nor the eventual (possibly narrowed, and on
// this fast path left stale/unset) value_unsigned/value_integer is
// ever consulted -- an unsigned/integer token is accepted outright,
// and even a >18-digit token that this fast path deliberately falls
// through for is, once reclassified to value_float, still finite
// (and thus accepted) for any digit count that fits in number_unsigned_t
// or number_integer_t regardless of that type's width. If this
// function is ever taught to run with discard_number_values true for
// a caller that *does* read the converted value, this reasoning (and
// the fast path below) would need to be revisited.
if (discard_number_values)
{
constexpr std::size_t safe_digit_count = 18;
if (number_type == token_type::value_unsigned && token_buffer.size() <= safe_digit_count)
{
return token_type::value_unsigned;
}
if (number_type == token_type::value_integer && token_buffer.size() - 1 <= safe_digit_count)
{
return token_type::value_integer;
}
}
char* endptr = nullptr; // NOLINT(misc-const-correctness,cppcoreguidelines-pro-type-vararg,hicpp-vararg)
errno = 0;
@@ -1807,13 +1754,6 @@ scan_number_done:
const char_int_type decimal_point_char = '.';
/// the position of the decimal point in the input
std::size_t decimal_point_position = std::string::npos;
/// whether the caller (e.g. accept()/json_sax_acceptor) only needs the
/// token classification and never looks at the converted numeric value;
/// when set, scan_number() may skip strtoull()/strtoll() for
/// value_unsigned/value_integer tokens whose digit count guarantees they
/// fit into 64 bits (see scan_number())
const bool discard_number_values = false;
};
} // namespace detail
+2 -3
View File
@@ -72,10 +72,9 @@ class parser
parser_callback_t<BasicJsonType> cb = nullptr,
const bool allow_exceptions_ = true,
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas_ = false,
const bool discard_number_values_ = false)
const bool ignore_trailing_commas_ = false)
: callback(std::move(cb))
, m_lexer(std::move(adapter), ignore_comments, discard_number_values_)
, m_lexer(std::move(adapter), ignore_comments)
, allow_exceptions(allow_exceptions_)
, ignore_trailing_commas(ignore_trailing_commas_)
{
+5 -6
View File
@@ -164,12 +164,11 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
detail::parser_callback_t<basic_json>cb = nullptr,
const bool allow_exceptions = true,
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false,
const bool discard_number_values = false
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false
)
{
return ::nlohmann::detail::parser<basic_json, InputAdapterType>(std::move(adapter),
std::move(cb), allow_exceptions, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, discard_number_values);
std::move(cb), allow_exceptions, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas);
}
private:
@@ -4134,7 +4133,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::forward<InputType>(i)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::forward<InputType>(i)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
/// @brief check if the input is valid JSON (iterator pair, or iterator+sentinel pair for C++20 ranges support)
@@ -4145,7 +4144,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::move(first), std::move(last)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::move(first), std::move(last)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
JSON_HEDLEY_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
@@ -4154,7 +4153,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(i.get(), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(i.get(), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
/// @brief generate SAX events
+28 -70
View File
@@ -7932,11 +7932,10 @@ class lexer : public lexer_base<BasicJsonType>
public:
using token_type = typename lexer_base<BasicJsonType>::token_type;
explicit lexer(InputAdapterType&& adapter, bool ignore_comments_ = false, bool discard_number_values_ = false) noexcept
explicit lexer(InputAdapterType&& adapter, bool ignore_comments_ = false) noexcept
: ia(std::move(adapter))
, ignore_comments(ignore_comments_)
, decimal_point_char(static_cast<char_int_type>(get_decimal_point()))
, discard_number_values(discard_number_values_)
{}
// deleted because of pointer members
@@ -9063,58 +9062,6 @@ scan_number_done:
// we are done scanning a number)
unget();
// If the caller does not need the converted value (only whether the
// input is syntactically valid; see json_sax_acceptor/accept()), an
// unsigned/integer token can be reported without calling
// strtoull()/strtoll() at all, *provided* we can already tell from
// the digit count alone that the conversion cannot overflow 64 bits.
// Such tokens are always finite and are accepted unconditionally by
// the parser regardless of their actual value (parser::sax_parse_internal()
// never checks finiteness for value_unsigned/value_integer), so the
// classification below is all that is needed.
//
// A decimal number with up to 18 digits is always representable in
// both std::uint64_t and std::int64_t (18 nines is ~1e18, well below
// both UINT64_MAX ~1.8e19 and INT64_MAX ~9.2e18), so strtoull()/strtoll()
// could not have set errno to ERANGE for it. Numbers with more digits
// (rare in practice) fall through to the exact code below, unchanged,
// so their handling -- including reclassification to value_float when
// the value overflows 64 bits, and rejection when it is not even
// finite as a double -- is bit-for-bit identical to before this
// optimization.
//
// Note this reasons about std::uint64_t/std::int64_t, not about
// number_unsigned_t/number_integer_t (BasicJsonType's own, possibly
// narrower, template parameters -- e.g. std::uint32_t). That is fine
// *only* because discard_number_values is exclusively set by
// accept() (see json.hpp), and accept() always parses through the
// library's own json_sax_acceptor -- never a user-supplied SAX
// consumer -- whose number_unsigned()/number_integer()/number_float()
// callbacks unconditionally discard their argument and return true.
// So for every caller that can reach this branch, neither the token
// classification below nor the eventual (possibly narrowed, and on
// this fast path left stale/unset) value_unsigned/value_integer is
// ever consulted -- an unsigned/integer token is accepted outright,
// and even a >18-digit token that this fast path deliberately falls
// through for is, once reclassified to value_float, still finite
// (and thus accepted) for any digit count that fits in number_unsigned_t
// or number_integer_t regardless of that type's width. If this
// function is ever taught to run with discard_number_values true for
// a caller that *does* read the converted value, this reasoning (and
// the fast path below) would need to be revisited.
if (discard_number_values)
{
constexpr std::size_t safe_digit_count = 18;
if (number_type == token_type::value_unsigned && token_buffer.size() <= safe_digit_count)
{
return token_type::value_unsigned;
}
if (number_type == token_type::value_integer && token_buffer.size() - 1 <= safe_digit_count)
{
return token_type::value_integer;
}
}
char* endptr = nullptr; // NOLINT(misc-const-correctness,cppcoreguidelines-pro-type-vararg,hicpp-vararg)
errno = 0;
@@ -9590,13 +9537,6 @@ scan_number_done:
const char_int_type decimal_point_char = '.';
/// the position of the decimal point in the input
std::size_t decimal_point_position = std::string::npos;
/// whether the caller (e.g. accept()/json_sax_acceptor) only needs the
/// token classification and never looks at the converted numeric value;
/// when set, scan_number() may skip strtoull()/strtoll() for
/// value_unsigned/value_integer tokens whose digit count guarantees they
/// fit into 64 bits (see scan_number())
const bool discard_number_values = false;
};
} // namespace detail
@@ -9889,6 +9829,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_parser
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
return true;
}
@@ -10249,6 +10199,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_callback_parser
{
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
}
return true;
@@ -14103,10 +14063,9 @@ class parser
parser_callback_t<BasicJsonType> cb = nullptr,
const bool allow_exceptions_ = true,
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas_ = false,
const bool discard_number_values_ = false)
const bool ignore_trailing_commas_ = false)
: callback(std::move(cb))
, m_lexer(std::move(adapter), ignore_comments, discard_number_values_)
, m_lexer(std::move(adapter), ignore_comments)
, allow_exceptions(allow_exceptions_)
, ignore_trailing_commas(ignore_trailing_commas_)
{
@@ -21653,12 +21612,11 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
detail::parser_callback_t<basic_json>cb = nullptr,
const bool allow_exceptions = true,
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false,
const bool discard_number_values = false
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false
)
{
return ::nlohmann::detail::parser<basic_json, InputAdapterType>(std::move(adapter),
std::move(cb), allow_exceptions, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, discard_number_values);
std::move(cb), allow_exceptions, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas);
}
private:
@@ -25623,7 +25581,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::forward<InputType>(i)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::forward<InputType>(i)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
/// @brief check if the input is valid JSON (iterator pair, or iterator+sentinel pair for C++20 ranges support)
@@ -25634,7 +25592,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::move(first), std::move(last)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(detail::input_adapter(std::move(first), std::move(last)), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
JSON_HEDLEY_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
@@ -25643,7 +25601,7 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
const bool ignore_comments = false,
const bool ignore_trailing_commas = false)
{
return parser(i.get(), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas, true).accept(true);
return parser(i.get(), nullptr, false, ignore_comments, ignore_trailing_commas).accept(true);
}
/// @brief generate SAX events
+105
View File
@@ -3489,6 +3489,111 @@ TEST_CASE("BJData")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length BJData arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// optimized form [$type#count: type 'i' (int8), count as a four-byte
// little-endian 'l' (int32) of 0x7FFFFFFF (2147483647), but no
// element data at all. max_size() for a std::vector is far larger
// than this count, so it does not reject the header outright; the
// (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', 'l', 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F};
// On a platform where std::vector<json>::max_size() is smaller than
// the claimed count (e.g. 32-bit, where max_size() is bounded by a
// 32-bit SIZE_MAX divided by sizeof(json)), the SAX consumer's own
// check rejects the header outright (out_of_range.408, with the
// claimed count in the message) instead of accepting it and only
// finding it short of data once the (capped) reservation looks for
// element bytes that were never provided (parse_error.110). Either
// is an acceptable, bounded rejection of the hostile header -- the
// property under test is that no path attempts to allocate space
// for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_bjdata(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 10: syntax error while parsing BJData number: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive array size") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
// json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check (unlike the
// scanner's own parse_error path) throws unconditionally via
// JSON_THROW rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so it is
// not gated by allow_exceptions=false on a platform where this
// header hits that check (e.g. 32-bit, see above) -- allow either
// a discarded result or the same out_of_range it throws with
// exceptions enabled.
try
{
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
CHECK(e.id == 408);
}
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
// exercise both the plain and the optimized [$type#count encoding
const auto packed_plain = json::to_bjdata(j);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(packed_plain) == j);
const auto packed_optimized = json::to_bjdata(j, true, true);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(packed_optimized) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_bjdata(j, true, true);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::bjdata));
}
}
TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1")
{
SECTION("Null Value")
+86
View File
@@ -2035,6 +2035,92 @@ TEST_CASE("CBOR definite length equal to the indefinite-length sentinel")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length CBOR arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// 0x9A: array with a four-byte length; claims 0xFFFFFFFF (4294967295)
// elements but provides none. max_size() for a std::vector is far
// larger than this count, so it does not reject the header outright;
// the (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {0x9A, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g.
// 32-bit), the claimed count 0xFFFFFFFF coincides with that
// platform's detail::unknown_size() sentinel (SIZE_MAX), so the
// format-level size check rejects it outright (out_of_range.408,
// "excessive ... size") before the SAX consumer's own max_size()
// check would even run; on a 64-bit platform it passes both of
// those checks and is only found short of data once the (capped)
// reservation looks for element bytes that were never provided
// (parse_error.110). Either is an acceptable, bounded rejection of
// the hostile header -- the property under test is that no path
// attempts to allocate space for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_cbor(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing CBOR value: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
CHECK(json::from_cbor(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
const auto packed = json::to_cbor(j);
CHECK(json::from_cbor(packed) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_cbor(j);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::cbor));
}
}
TEST_CASE("CBOR roundtrips" * doctest::skip())
{
SECTION("input from flynn")
-92
View File
@@ -930,98 +930,6 @@ TEST_CASE("parser class")
CHECK(accept_helper("+1") == false);
CHECK(accept_helper("+0") == false);
}
SECTION("issue #5411 - skip conversion when accept() does not need the numeric value")
{
// lexer::scan_number() may skip strtoull()/strtoll() for
// value_unsigned/value_integer tokens when the caller (e.g.
// json::accept()) does not need the converted value, as long
// as the digit count alone guarantees no 64-bit overflow (see
// the "safe_digit_count" fast path in scan_number()). This
// differential test checks that json::accept() (which enables
// the fast path) and json::parse() (which never does) always
// agree, over a corpus that exercises both the fast path
// (<=18 digits) and the untouched, exact fallback path (>=19
// digits) -- including reclassification of huge digit-only
// integers to a (possibly non-finite) floating-point value.
const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, bool>> cases =
{
// normal small/large integers, both signs
{"0", true}, {"1", true}, {"-1", true}, {"42", true}, {"-42", true},
{"123456789", true}, {"-123456789", true},
// digit-count boundary around the 18-digit safe cutoff (both signs)
{std::string(17, '9'), true},
{std::string(18, '9'), true},
{std::string(19, '9'), true},
{std::string(20, '9'), true},
{"-" + std::string(17, '9'), true},
{"-" + std::string(18, '9'), true},
{"-" + std::string(19, '9'), true},
{"-" + std::string(20, '9'), true},
// 64-bit boundaries
{"9223372036854775807", true}, // INT64_MAX
{"-9223372036854775808", true}, // INT64_MIN
{"18446744073709551615", true}, // UINT64_MAX
{"18446744073709551616", true}, // UINT64_MAX + 1 (overflows uint64_t, finite double)
// the 28-digit example from the issue: overflows uint64_t
// but is finite as a double, so the scanner reclassifies
// it to value_float and it is accepted
{"9999999999999999999999999999", true},
// huge digit-only integers that overflow even a double -> rejected
{std::string(309, '9'), false},
{std::string(400, '9'), false},
{"1" + std::string(400, '0'), false},
// 1e999 / 1e400 style overflow -> rejected
{"1e999", false},
{"1e400", false},
{"-1e999", false},
{"1E999", false},
// values straddling DBL_MAX
{"1.7976931348623157e308", true}, // <= DBL_MAX, finite
{"1.7976931348623159e308", false}, // > DBL_MAX, overflows to inf
// a mix of other valid/invalid numeric syntax
{"3.14159", true},
{"-0.0", true},
{"1.0e10", true},
{"01", false},
{"-", false},
{"1.", false},
{"1e", false},
{"+1", false},
};
for (const auto& c : cases)
{
const std::string& number = c.first;
const bool expected = c.second;
CAPTURE(number)
CAPTURE(expected)
// accept() takes the fast path (skips conversion when possible)
CHECK(json::accept(number) == expected);
// parse() always performs the full conversion; it must agree
json j;
CHECK_NOTHROW(json::parser(nlohmann::detail::input_adapter(number), nullptr, false).parse(true, j));
CHECK(!j.is_discarded() == expected);
// wrap in an array so get_token() is exercised beyond the
// very first (constructor-time) scan as well
std::string wrapped = "[";
wrapped += number;
wrapped += ",";
wrapped += number;
wrapped += "]";
CHECK(json::accept(wrapped) == expected);
}
}
}
}
+85
View File
@@ -1597,6 +1597,91 @@ TEST_CASE("MessagePack")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length MessagePack arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// 0xdd: array 32 (four-byte length); claims 0xFFFFFFFF (4294967295)
// elements but provides none. max_size() for a std::vector is far
// larger than this count, so it does not reject the header outright;
// the (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {0xdd, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g.
// 32-bit), the claimed count 0xFFFFFFFF coincides with that
// platform's SIZE_MAX, which some size-narrowing checks treat the
// same as detail::unknown_size(); it may then be rejected before
// the SAX consumer's own max_size() check (out_of_range.408) rather
// than being accepted and only found short of data once the
// (capped) reservation looks for element bytes that were never
// provided (parse_error.110). Either is an acceptable, bounded
// rejection of the hostile header -- the property under test is
// that no path attempts to allocate space for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_msgpack(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing MessagePack value: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
CHECK(json::from_msgpack(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
const auto packed = json::to_msgpack(j);
CHECK(json::from_msgpack(packed) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_msgpack(j);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::msgpack));
}
}
// use this testcase outside [hide] to run it with Valgrind
TEST_CASE("single MessagePack roundtrip")
{
+105
View File
@@ -2149,6 +2149,111 @@ TEST_CASE("UBJSON")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length UBJSON arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// optimized form [$type#count: type 'i' (int8), count as a four-byte
// 'l' (int32) of 0x7FFFFFFF (2147483647), but no element data at all.
// max_size() for a std::vector is far larger than this count, so it
// does not reject the header outright; the (capped) reservation must
// not attempt to allocate space for billions of elements before the
// missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', 'l', 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::vector<json>::max_size() is smaller than
// the claimed count (e.g. 32-bit, where max_size() is bounded by a
// 32-bit SIZE_MAX divided by sizeof(json)), the SAX consumer's own
// check rejects the header outright (out_of_range.408, with the
// claimed count in the message) instead of accepting it and only
// finding it short of data once the (capped) reservation looks for
// element bytes that were never provided (parse_error.110). Either
// is an acceptable, bounded rejection of the hostile header -- the
// property under test is that no path attempts to allocate space
// for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_ubjson(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 10: syntax error while parsing UBJSON number: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive array size") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
// json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check (unlike the
// scanner's own parse_error path) throws unconditionally via
// JSON_THROW rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so it is
// not gated by allow_exceptions=false on a platform where this
// header hits that check (e.g. 32-bit, see above) -- allow either
// a discarded result or the same out_of_range it throws with
// exceptions enabled.
try
{
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
CHECK(e.id == 408);
}
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
// exercise both the plain and the optimized [$type#count encoding
const auto packed_plain = json::to_ubjson(j);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(packed_plain) == j);
const auto packed_optimized = json::to_ubjson(j, true, true);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(packed_optimized) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_ubjson(j, true, true);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::ubjson));
}
}
TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1")
{
SECTION("Null Value")