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Author SHA1 Message Date
Niels Lohmann 1c9475d68f Fix remaining CI failures in the huge-claimed-length DoS regression tests
- Apply the same google-readability-casting fix (std::size_t{N} instead
  of std::size_t(N)) to the "arrays of various sizes" section in
  unit-msgpack.cpp, unit-ubjson.cpp, and unit-bjdata.cpp; only
  unit-cbor.cpp had been fixed previously, since clang-tidy's build
  didn't get far enough to report the other three in the same pass.

- json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check calls JSON_THROW
  directly rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so unlike the
  scanner's own "not enough data" parse_error it is not gated by
  allow_exceptions=false. On a platform where a header's claimed count
  exceeds max_size() (e.g. 32-bit, for UBJSON/BJData's 0x7FFFFFFF test
  value), from_ubjson/from_bjdata(input, true, false) can therefore still
  throw instead of returning a discarded value. Make that assertion
  tolerant of either outcome, same as the main exception-catching check
  above it.

- Guard all four "a huge claimed length..." SECTIONs with
  #if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION), matching this test suite's existing
  convention for exception-dependent tests: under JSON_NOEXCEPTION,
  JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++ exception at all (it aborts
  the process), so a section that relies on try/catch to distinguish
  between two acceptable outcomes cannot be expressed under that build
  configuration regardless of platform.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-06 20:08:27 +02:00
Niels Lohmann 98ab9f31c3 Make the huge-claimed-length DoS regression tests portable across size_t widths
On a platform where size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g. 32-bit mingw/msvc
x86), the previously-hardcoded huge test lengths either collide with that
platform's unknown_size() sentinel (CBOR/MessagePack, both using exactly
SIZE_MAX) or exceed the platform's smaller vector<json>::max_size()
(UBJSON/BJData's 0x7FFFFFFF), so the header is now rejected outright
(out_of_range.408) instead of being accepted and only found short of data
(parse_error.110). Both are safe, bounded rejections of the hostile input;
the property under test -- no attempt to allocate space for billions of
elements -- holds either way. Accept both outcomes instead of pinning the
64-bit-only exact result.

Also fixed an unrelated clang-tidy finding (google-readability-casting) on
the functional-style std::size_t(...) casts in the neighboring "arrays of
various sizes" section.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-06 11:19:06 +02:00
Niels Lohmann aee9421883 Reserve capped array capacity for definite-length binary arrays
CBOR, MessagePack, and the optimized [$type#count UBJSON/BJData form all
pass an exact element count to sax->start_array(len), but
json_sax_dom_parser::start_array() (and the callback variant) only used
len for an overflow check against max_size() and never reserved the
underlying vector, so each element triggered a reallocation cascade via
emplace_back().

Reserve upfront, but cap the reservation at 16384 elements: max_size()
for a std::vector is far larger than any realistic input, so an
unbounded reserve(len) would let a crafted/truncated header (e.g. CBOR
0x9A + a huge uint32 count with no data) trigger a multi-gigabyte
allocation attempt instead of the normal graceful parse_error. With the
cap, a hostile length still fails fast with the existing parse_error,
while realistic arrays get a single up-front allocation.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-05 20:51:47 +02:00
11 changed files with 421 additions and 89 deletions
-4
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ Strong guarantee: if an exception is thrown, there are no changes in the JSON va
("add", "remove", "move")
- Throws [`out_of_range.411`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range411) if an "add" operation's target
location has a parent that is neither an object nor an array.
- Throws [`out_of_range.413`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range413) if a "remove" operation's target
location has a parent that is neither an object nor an array.
- Throws [`other_error.501`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionother_error501) if "test" operation was
unsuccessful.
@@ -77,5 +75,3 @@ is thrown. In any case, the original value is not changed: the patch is applied
- Added in version 2.0.0.
- Added [`out_of_range.411`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range411) and stopped relying on an internal assertion when an "add" operation's
target location has a non-object/non-array parent in version 3.13.0.
- Added [`out_of_range.413`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range413) and stopped silently ignoring a "remove" operation whose target
location has a non-object/non-array parent in version 3.13.0.
@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ No guarantees, value may be corrupted by an unsuccessful patch operation.
("add", "remove", "move")
- Throws [`out_of_range.411`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range411) if an "add" operation's target
location has a parent that is neither an object nor an array.
- Throws [`out_of_range.413`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range413) if a "remove" operation's target
location has a parent that is neither an object nor an array.
- Throws [`other_error.501`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionother_error501) if "test" operation was
unsuccessful.
@@ -74,5 +72,3 @@ function throws an exception.
- Added in version 3.11.0.
- Added [`out_of_range.411`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range411) and stopped relying on an internal assertion when an "add" operation's
target location has a non-object/non-array parent in version 3.13.0.
- Added [`out_of_range.413`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range413) and stopped silently ignoring a "remove" operation whose target
location has a non-object/non-array parent in version 3.13.0.
-14
View File
@@ -933,20 +933,6 @@ BSON stores the length of documents, arrays, strings, and binary values in a sig
[`to_bson`](../api/basic_json/to_bson.md) produced documents with negative length prefixes that
[`from_bson`](../api/basic_json/from_bson.md) rejected.
### json.exception.out_of_range.413
A JSON Patch `remove` operation cannot be applied because the target location's parent is neither an object nor an array. Per [RFC 6902](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6902), a `remove` target must reference a member of an existing object or an element of an existing array; a primitive value (string, number, boolean, etc.) or `null` has no members or elements to remove.
!!! failure "Example message"
```
cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type number, but must be an object or array
```
!!! note
This exception was added in version 3.13.0. Before that, this situation was silently ignored (the `remove` operation had no effect).
## Further exceptions
This exception is thrown in case of errors that cannot be classified with the
@@ -301,6 +301,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_parser
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
return true;
}
@@ -661,6 +671,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_callback_parser
{
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
}
return true;
-6
View File
@@ -4939,12 +4939,6 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
// note erase performs range check
parent.erase(json_pointer::template array_index<basic_json_t>(last_path));
}
else
{
// the parent of a "remove" target must be an object or array
// (see #5396)
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(413, detail::concat("cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type ", parent.type_name(), ", but must be an object or array"), &parent));
}
};
// type check: top level value must be an array
+20 -6
View File
@@ -9829,6 +9829,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_parser
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
return true;
}
@@ -10189,6 +10199,16 @@ class json_sax_dom_callback_parser
{
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(408, concat("excessive array size: ", std::to_string(len)), ref_stack.back()));
}
if (len != detail::unknown_size())
{
// reserve upfront to avoid repeated reallocations while adding elements,
// but cap the reservation so a bogus/hostile length (which is not bounded
// by max_size(), unlike e.g. std::vector) cannot trigger an oversized
// allocation for a small or truncated input
constexpr std::size_t reserve_cap = 16384;
ref_stack.back()->m_data.m_value.array->reserve(len < reserve_cap ? len : reserve_cap);
}
}
return true;
@@ -26367,12 +26387,6 @@ class basic_json // NOLINT(cppcoreguidelines-special-member-functions,hicpp-spec
// note erase performs range check
parent.erase(json_pointer::template array_index<basic_json_t>(last_path));
}
else
{
// the parent of a "remove" target must be an object or array
// (see #5396)
JSON_THROW(out_of_range::create(413, detail::concat("cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type ", parent.type_name(), ", but must be an object or array"), &parent));
}
};
// type check: top level value must be an array
+105
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@@ -3489,6 +3489,111 @@ TEST_CASE("BJData")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length BJData arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// optimized form [$type#count: type 'i' (int8), count as a four-byte
// little-endian 'l' (int32) of 0x7FFFFFFF (2147483647), but no
// element data at all. max_size() for a std::vector is far larger
// than this count, so it does not reject the header outright; the
// (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', 'l', 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F};
// On a platform where std::vector<json>::max_size() is smaller than
// the claimed count (e.g. 32-bit, where max_size() is bounded by a
// 32-bit SIZE_MAX divided by sizeof(json)), the SAX consumer's own
// check rejects the header outright (out_of_range.408, with the
// claimed count in the message) instead of accepting it and only
// finding it short of data once the (capped) reservation looks for
// element bytes that were never provided (parse_error.110). Either
// is an acceptable, bounded rejection of the hostile header -- the
// property under test is that no path attempts to allocate space
// for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_bjdata(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 10: syntax error while parsing BJData number: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive array size") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
// json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check (unlike the
// scanner's own parse_error path) throws unconditionally via
// JSON_THROW rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so it is
// not gated by allow_exceptions=false on a platform where this
// header hits that check (e.g. 32-bit, see above) -- allow either
// a discarded result or the same out_of_range it throws with
// exceptions enabled.
try
{
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
CHECK(e.id == 408);
}
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
// exercise both the plain and the optimized [$type#count encoding
const auto packed_plain = json::to_bjdata(j);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(packed_plain) == j);
const auto packed_optimized = json::to_bjdata(j, true, true);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(packed_optimized) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_bjdata(j, true, true);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::bjdata));
}
}
TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1")
{
SECTION("Null Value")
+86
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@@ -2035,6 +2035,92 @@ TEST_CASE("CBOR definite length equal to the indefinite-length sentinel")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length CBOR arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// 0x9A: array with a four-byte length; claims 0xFFFFFFFF (4294967295)
// elements but provides none. max_size() for a std::vector is far
// larger than this count, so it does not reject the header outright;
// the (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {0x9A, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g.
// 32-bit), the claimed count 0xFFFFFFFF coincides with that
// platform's detail::unknown_size() sentinel (SIZE_MAX), so the
// format-level size check rejects it outright (out_of_range.408,
// "excessive ... size") before the SAX consumer's own max_size()
// check would even run; on a 64-bit platform it passes both of
// those checks and is only found short of data once the (capped)
// reservation looks for element bytes that were never provided
// (parse_error.110). Either is an acceptable, bounded rejection of
// the hostile header -- the property under test is that no path
// attempts to allocate space for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_cbor(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing CBOR value: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
CHECK(json::from_cbor(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
const auto packed = json::to_cbor(j);
CHECK(json::from_cbor(packed) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_cbor(j);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::cbor));
}
}
TEST_CASE("CBOR roundtrips" * doctest::skip())
{
SECTION("input from flynn")
-55
View File
@@ -1389,61 +1389,6 @@ TEST_CASE("JSON patch - add to a primitive parent (regression #4292)")
}
}
TEST_CASE("JSON patch - remove with primitive or null parent (regression #5396)")
{
// Regression test for https://github.com/nlohmann/json/issues/5396
//
// RFC 6902 (§4.2) requires the target location of a "remove" operation
// to exist. When the target's parent resolves to a primitive value or
// null, the operation must fail. Previously operation_remove silently
// did nothing in this case (neither the "is_object" nor the "is_array"
// branch matched, and there was no final "else"), so the patch appeared
// to succeed without changing the document. It now throws
// out_of_range.413.
SECTION("parent is a primitive (number)")
{
json const doc = {{"a", 1}};
json const patch = {{{"op", "remove"}, {"path", "/a/b"}}};
#if JSON_DIAGNOSTICS
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(doc.patch(patch), "[json.exception.out_of_range.413] (/a) cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type number, but must be an object or array", json::out_of_range&);
#else
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(doc.patch(patch), "[json.exception.out_of_range.413] cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type number, but must be an object or array", json::out_of_range&);
#endif
}
SECTION("parent is a primitive (string)")
{
json const doc = {{"foo", {{"bar", "a string"}}}};
json const patch = {{{"op", "remove"}, {"path", "/foo/bar/baz"}}};
#if JSON_DIAGNOSTICS
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(doc.patch(patch), "[json.exception.out_of_range.413] (/foo/bar) cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type string, but must be an object or array", json::out_of_range&);
#else
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(doc.patch(patch), "[json.exception.out_of_range.413] cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type string, but must be an object or array", json::out_of_range&);
#endif
}
SECTION("top-level document is null")
{
json const doc = nullptr;
json const patch = {{{"op", "remove"}, {"path", "/a"}}};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(doc.patch(patch), "[json.exception.out_of_range.413] cannot remove value: the JSON Patch 'remove' target's parent is of type null, but must be an object or array", json::out_of_range&);
}
SECTION("legitimate removes still work")
{
// object member
json const doc1 = {{"a", 1}, {"b", 2}};
json const patch1 = {{{"op", "remove"}, {"path", "/a"}}};
CHECK(doc1.patch(patch1) == json({{"b", 2}}));
// array element
json const doc2 = R"([1, 2, 3])"_json;
json const patch2 = {{{"op", "remove"}, {"path", "/1"}}};
CHECK(doc2.patch(patch2) == R"([1, 3])"_json);
}
}
TEST_CASE("JSON patch - diff emits array removals in descending index order")
{
SECTION("array shrunk to empty")
+85
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@@ -1597,6 +1597,91 @@ TEST_CASE("MessagePack")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length MessagePack arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// 0xdd: array 32 (four-byte length); claims 0xFFFFFFFF (4294967295)
// elements but provides none. max_size() for a std::vector is far
// larger than this count, so it does not reject the header outright;
// the (capped) reservation must not attempt to allocate space for
// billions of elements before the missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {0xdd, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::size_t is narrower than 64 bits (e.g.
// 32-bit), the claimed count 0xFFFFFFFF coincides with that
// platform's SIZE_MAX, which some size-narrowing checks treat the
// same as detail::unknown_size(); it may then be rejected before
// the SAX consumer's own max_size() check (out_of_range.408) rather
// than being accepted and only found short of data once the
// (capped) reservation looks for element bytes that were never
// provided (parse_error.110). Either is an acceptable, bounded
// rejection of the hostile header -- the property under test is
// that no path attempts to allocate space for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_msgpack(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing MessagePack value: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
CHECK(json::from_msgpack(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
const auto packed = json::to_msgpack(j);
CHECK(json::from_msgpack(packed) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_msgpack(j);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::msgpack));
}
}
// use this testcase outside [hide] to run it with Valgrind
TEST_CASE("single MessagePack roundtrip")
{
+105
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@@ -2149,6 +2149,111 @@ TEST_CASE("UBJSON")
}
}
TEST_CASE("issue #5405 - array reserve for definite-length UBJSON arrays")
{
#if !defined(JSON_NOEXCEPTION)
// this SECTION relies on catching a thrown exception to distinguish
// which of two acceptable, bounded rejections a hostile header took;
// under JSON_NOEXCEPTION, JSON_THROW never produces a catchable C++
// exception (it aborts instead), so this cannot be tested that way here
SECTION("a huge claimed length with no element data must not over-allocate")
{
// optimized form [$type#count: type 'i' (int8), count as a four-byte
// 'l' (int32) of 0x7FFFFFFF (2147483647), but no element data at all.
// max_size() for a std::vector is far larger than this count, so it
// does not reject the header outright; the (capped) reservation must
// not attempt to allocate space for billions of elements before the
// missing data is detected.
json _;
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', 'l', 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
// On a platform where std::vector<json>::max_size() is smaller than
// the claimed count (e.g. 32-bit, where max_size() is bounded by a
// 32-bit SIZE_MAX divided by sizeof(json)), the SAX consumer's own
// check rejects the header outright (out_of_range.408, with the
// claimed count in the message) instead of accepting it and only
// finding it short of data once the (capped) reservation looks for
// element bytes that were never provided (parse_error.110). Either
// is an acceptable, bounded rejection of the hostile header -- the
// property under test is that no path attempts to allocate space
// for billions of elements.
bool threw = false;
try
{
_ = json::from_ubjson(input);
}
catch (const json::parse_error& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 110);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()) == "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 10: syntax error while parsing UBJSON number: unexpected end of input");
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
threw = true;
CHECK(e.id == 408);
CHECK(std::string(e.what()).find("excessive array size") != std::string::npos);
}
CHECK(threw);
// json_sax_dom_parser::start_array()'s max_size() check (unlike the
// scanner's own parse_error path) throws unconditionally via
// JSON_THROW rather than going through sax->parse_error(), so it is
// not gated by allow_exceptions=false on a platform where this
// header hits that check (e.g. 32-bit, see above) -- allow either
// a discarded result or the same out_of_range it throws with
// exceptions enabled.
try
{
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
catch (const json::out_of_range& e)
{
CHECK(e.id == 408);
}
}
#endif
SECTION("arrays of various sizes decode to the same value as before the reserve optimization")
{
for (const auto size :
{
std::size_t{0}, std::size_t{1}, std::size_t{5}, // small
std::size_t{16384}, // exactly at the reserve cap
std::size_t{20000} // above the reserve cap
})
{
CAPTURE(size)
json j = json::array();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
j.push_back(static_cast<int>(i % 1000));
}
// exercise both the plain and the optimized [$type#count encoding
const auto packed_plain = json::to_ubjson(j);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(packed_plain) == j);
const auto packed_optimized = json::to_ubjson(j, true, true);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(packed_optimized) == j);
}
}
SECTION("a user-defined SAX consumer is unaffected by the internal DOM reserve optimization")
{
// the reserve() call is local to json_sax_dom_parser / json_sax_dom_callback_parser;
// a custom SAX consumer that does not touch a DOM array sees identical events
json j = json::array();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i)
{
j.push_back(i);
}
const auto packed = json::to_ubjson(j, true, true);
SaxCountdown scp(1000000); // large enough to never trigger an abort
CHECK(json::sax_parse(packed, &scp, json::input_format_t::ubjson));
}
}
TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1")
{
SECTION("Null Value")