Add a security assurance case to the documentation

Describe the threat model, the trust boundaries, the secure-design
argument, and how common weaknesses are countered, with links to the
quality assurance page as evidence.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>

docs/mkdocs/docs/community/assurance_case.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Assurance case
+
+This page argues why the library meets its security requirements. It describes the threats the library faces, where the
+trust boundaries lie, and how the library's design and the [quality assurance](quality_assurance.md) counter these
+threats. To report a vulnerability, see the [security policy](security_policy.md).
+
+## Threat model
+
+The library parses, stores, and serializes JSON values in memory. It does not open network connections, does not open
+files (it only reads from streams or `std::FILE*` handles that the caller has already opened), does not read environment
+variables, and does not implement cryptography or handle credentials.
+
+The primary threat is therefore **untrusted input**: JSON text or binary data (BJData, BSON, CBOR, MessagePack, UBJSON)
+that an attacker controls, passed to [`parse`](../api/basic_json/parse.md), [`accept`](../api/basic_json/accept.md),
+[`sax_parse`](../api/basic_json/sax_parse.md), or one of the `from_*` functions such as
+[`from_cbor`](../api/basic_json/from_cbor.md). Such input may try to
+
+- make the library read or write out of bounds (malformed lengths, truncated input, invalid UTF-8),
+- trigger undefined behavior (integer overflow in sizes or numbers, invalid casts),
+- exhaust memory (huge announced sizes), or
+- exhaust the call stack (deeply nested arrays and objects).
+
+## Trust boundaries
+
+- **Untrusted:** all serialized input read by the parser, the SAX interface, and the binary readers. The library must
+  handle every possible input by either producing a value or throwing a [`parse_error`](../home/exceptions.md#parse-errors)
+  (or returning `false` when exceptions are disabled for the call).
+- **Trusted:** the C++ code that calls the library. Calling a function with violated preconditions, for instance
+  accessing an array with [`operator[]`](../api/basic_json/operator%5B%5D.md) out of range, is a programming error and
+  not a security boundary. Such preconditions are checked with [runtime assertions](../features/assertions.md) in debug
+  builds; functions such as [`at`](../api/basic_json/at.md) offer checked access with exceptions.
+
+## Secure design
+
+- **Strict parsing.** The parser accepts exactly the JSON grammar of [RFC 8259](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8259).
+  Extensions such as [comments](../features/comments.md) and [trailing commas](../features/trailing_commas.md) must be
+  enabled explicitly. Invalid UTF-8 is rejected.
+- **Errors are reported, not ignored.** Malformed input results in a [`parse_error`](../home/exceptions.md#parse-errors)
+  with the byte position of the error. Binary readers do not trust announced sizes: strings and binary values grow
+  only as bytes are actually read, arrays reserve at most a fixed number of elements up front, and sizes that no
+  container can hold are rejected.
+- **Memory is owned by values.** Each `basic_json` value owns its content, and there is no manual memory management in
+  user code. The destructor does not recurse, so destroying a deeply nested value does not exhaust the stack.
+- **Bounded recursion.** The JSON parser and the binary readers keep their state in explicit stacks instead of
+  recursing per nesting level. Operations that walk a value, such as [`dump`](../api/basic_json/dump.md), copying,
+  hashing, and [`merge_patch`](../api/basic_json/merge_patch.md), recurse only up to a fixed depth and continue with an
+  explicit stack below it. Some operations, such as comparison, [`diff`](../api/basic_json/diff.md),
+  [`flatten`](../api/basic_json/flatten.md), and the binary writers, still recurse once per nesting level; work on them
+  is in progress. Applications that process untrusted input can limit its nesting depth with a
+  [parser callback](../features/parsing/parser_callbacks.md).
+- **Invariants are checked.** The class invariant (for instance, that the pointer for the stored type is never null) is
+  checked with runtime assertions throughout the test suite.
+
+## Common weaknesses
+
+The following table maps the relevant classes of the [Common Weakness Enumeration](https://cwe.mitre.org) to the
+measures that counter them. The measures are described in detail in [Quality assurance](quality_assurance.md).
+
+| Weakness                                                                  | Countermeasures                                                                                  |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Out-of-bounds read/write ([CWE-125](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html), [CWE-787](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html)) | bounds checks on all reads from the input; AddressSanitizer and Valgrind on the test suite; OSS-Fuzz      |
+| Integer overflow ([CWE-190](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html)) | UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer with integer overflow detection; Clang-Tidy; Cppcheck                 |
+| Use after free, double free ([CWE-416](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html), [CWE-415](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/415.html)) | ownership of all memory by values; AddressSanitizer and Valgrind; Clang Static Analyzer          |
+| Memory leaks ([CWE-401](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/401.html)) | Valgrind (Memcheck) on the test suite                                                            |
+| Uncontrolled recursion ([CWE-674](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/674.html)) | iterative parser, binary readers, and destructor; bounded recursion in value operations; tests with deeply nested inputs |
+| Uncontrolled resource consumption ([CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)) | allocations based on announced sizes are capped; OSS-Fuzz with memory limits                     |
+| Undefined behavior in general ([CWE-758](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/758.html)) | UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer; runtime assertions; Clang-Tidy, Cppcheck, Clang Static Analyzer, Infer |
+
+In addition, every line of the library is covered by the unit tests, and all parsers are fuzz-tested around the clock
+by [OSS-Fuzz](https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/json).

docs/mkdocs/docs/community/index.md

@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@
 - [Governance](governance.md) - the governance model of this project
 - [Quality Assurance](quality_assurance.md) - how the quality of this project is assured
 - [Security Policy](security_policy.md) - the security policy of the project
+- [Assurance Case](assurance_case.md) - why the library meets its security requirements

docs/mkdocs/mkdocs.yml

@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ nav:
       - community/quality_assurance.md
       - community/governance.md
       - community/security_policy.md
+      - community/assurance_case.md
 
 # Extras
 extra: