Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
Niels Lohmann ee69490b28 Bound UBJSON optimized arrays of a valueless type
An element of type 'Z' (null), 'T' (true) or 'F' (false) is encoded by its
type marker alone, so an optimized UBJSON array of one of those has no
payload: reading an element consumes no input at all. Its declared count is
therefore the only thing that decides how much is allocated, and nothing
bounded it. "[$Z#l" and a four-byte count is nine bytes of input describing
two billion values; #2793 reports 35 GB and 150 seconds from ten bytes, and
OSS-Fuzz has an out-of-memory and a timeout report for the same shape.

Every other type costs at least one byte per element, so the end of the input
bounds it. 'N' (no-op) is already skipped rather than stored. Objects are not
affected either: each element is preceded by its key, which costs bytes. And
BJData already refuses these markers as an optimized type, so this is a plain
UBJSON matter.

Reject a count above 1,048,576 elements for those three types with
out_of_range.408, the code this reader already uses for a declared size it
will not honour. The check runs before the SAX start event, so no container
is opened and then abandoned.

Rejecting on the read side alone would break the guarantee that anything
to_ubjson() writes can be read back, and would trip the round-trip assertion
in fuzzer-parse_ubjson.cpp. So the writer falls back to the unoptimized
encoding, one byte per element, for arrays of these types above the same
limit. Its decision depends only on the array's size, which is identical for
a value and for anything parsed back from it, so the round trip is stable.

No existing test changes: the largest such count in the test suite is 65,793.
The excessive-size test that already used this shape still passes, now
rejected a little earlier than by the max_size() check it used to reach.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-07 07:50:29 +02:00
Niels Lohmann 3970ecccd1 Reject a nested BJData ndarray dimension vector where it is read
get_ubjson_size_type() takes an inside_ndarray parameter saying whether it is
being called for an ndarray's dimension vector, where another ndarray is not
allowed. It then seeded the flag it passes down to get_ubjson_size_value()
with `false` rather than with that parameter, and only consulted
inside_ndarray afterwards, on the '$' branch.

So on the '#' branch nothing stopped the descent: every "#[" pair of an input
like "[" followed by "#[#[#[..." opened another dimension vector, several
native stack frames deeper each time, and the recursion was only reported on
the way back out. 100,000 pairs crash the process. This is #5104 again, in a
path that has nothing to do with containers.

Seed the flag with inside_ndarray, which is what get_ubjson_size_value()
documents it wants: "for input, `true` means already inside an ndarray vector
or ndarray dimension is not allowed". The nested '[' is then refused where it
is read, so the length of the chain no longer matters.

Both post-checks gain `&& !inside_ndarray`, because an ndarray was found
*here* only if the flag flipped -- get_ubjson_size_value() only ever returns
`true` when its initial value was `false`, as its documentation says. With
that, the "ndarray can not be recursive" branch is unreachable: a recursive
ndarray is now caught one level earlier, and reported as "ndarray dimensional
vector is not allowed" like every other nested dimension vector.

Three existing expectations move accordingly (vR2, vR4, vR6). All three now
fail earlier, and all three now report the same error that vR1, vR5 and vH
already reported for the same shape, which is the more consistent outcome.
Everything else is unchanged: valid 1D and 2D ndarrays, optimized containers
and plain arrays produce identical results, and unit-ubjson is untouched.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>
2026-09-07 07:50:28 +02:00
7 changed files with 200 additions and 21 deletions
@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ The library uses the following mapping from JSON values types to UBJSON types ac
Note that `use_size = true` alone may result in larger representations - the benefit of this parameter is that the Note that `use_size = true` alone may result in larger representations - the benefit of this parameter is that the
receiving side is immediately informed on the number of elements of the container. receiving side is immediately informed on the number of elements of the container.
An array whose type marker is `Z` (null), `T` (true) or `F` (false) stores no payload at all, because the marker
already is the value. Its declared count is therefore the only thing that decides how much memory the receiving side
allocates, and a handful of bytes can describe billions of elements. `from_ubjson` rejects such an array with
[`out_of_range.408`](../../home/exceptions.md#jsonexceptionout_of_range408) when the count exceeds 1,048,576, and
`to_ubjson` writes longer arrays of these types without the annotation, so any value it produces can be read back.
!!! info "Binary values" !!! info "Binary values"
If the JSON data contains the binary type, the value stored is a list of integers, as suggested by the UBJSON If the JSON data contains the binary type, the value stored is a list of integers, as suggested by the UBJSON
+9
View File
@@ -868,6 +868,12 @@ The size of an array or object in a [binary format](../features/binary_formats/i
the size following `#` for [UBJSON](../features/binary_formats/ubjson.md)/[BJData](../features/binary_formats/bjdata.md), the size following `#` for [UBJSON](../features/binary_formats/ubjson.md)/[BJData](../features/binary_formats/bjdata.md),
or the encoded length for [CBOR](../features/binary_formats/cbor.md). or the encoded length for [CBOR](../features/binary_formats/cbor.md).
The exception is also thrown for a [UBJSON](../features/binary_formats/ubjson.md) array of a type that is encoded by its
marker alone (`Z`, `T` or `F`) whose declared count exceeds 1,048,576. Such an array has no payload, so its count alone
decides how much memory is allocated, and a handful of bytes would otherwise describe billions of values.
[`to_ubjson`](../api/basic_json/to_ubjson.md) writes longer arrays of these types without the size and type annotation,
so any value it produces can still be read back.
!!! failure "Example messages" !!! failure "Example messages"
``` ```
@@ -879,6 +885,9 @@ or the encoded length for [CBOR](../features/binary_formats/cbor.md).
``` ```
[json.exception.out_of_range.408] syntax error while parsing CBOR size: excessive map size [json.exception.out_of_range.408] syntax error while parsing CBOR size: excessive map size
``` ```
```
[json.exception.out_of_range.408] syntax error while parsing UBJSON size: excessive array size
```
### json.exception.out_of_range.409 ### json.exception.out_of_range.409
@@ -58,6 +58,26 @@ inline bool little_endianness(int num = 1) noexcept
return *reinterpret_cast<char*>(&num) == 1; return *reinterpret_cast<char*>(&num) == 1;
} }
/*!
@brief largest element count accepted for a UBJSON container of a valueless type
An element of type 'Z' (null), 'T' (true) or 'F' (false) is encoded by its
type marker alone, so an optimized container of one of those types has no
payload at all and its declared count is the only thing that decides how much
is allocated: `[$Z#L` followed by a large count turns some ten bytes of input
into that many values (see #2793, which reports 35 GB and 150 seconds). Every
other type costs at least one byte per element and is bounded by the end of
the input.
This is a sanity bound rather than a security boundary, and it is far above
any container met in practice. @ref binary_writer falls back to the
unoptimized encoding for longer containers, so that a value serialized by
this library can always be read back.
@sa https://github.com/nlohmann/json/issues/2793
*/
JSON_INLINE_VARIABLE constexpr std::size_t max_valueless_container_size = 1 << 20;
/////////////////// ///////////////////
// binary reader // // binary reader //
/////////////////// ///////////////////
@@ -2477,7 +2497,12 @@ class binary_reader
{ {
result.first = npos; // size result.first = npos; // size
result.second = 0; // type result.second = 0; // type
bool is_ndarray = false; // seed the flag with the caller's context: inside an ndarray dimension
// vector another ndarray is not allowed, and get_ubjson_size_value()
// rejects it up front instead of reading it and reporting afterwards.
// Seeding it with `false` made every '#' of a "[#[#[..." chain descend
// another level, which overflowed the stack (see #5104).
bool is_ndarray = inside_ndarray;
get_ignore_noop(); get_ignore_noop();
@@ -2510,13 +2535,11 @@ class binary_reader
} }
const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray); const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray);
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray) // an ndarray was read here only if the flag flipped; when it was
// seeded true, get_ubjson_size_value() already rejected the nested
// dimension vector
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray && !inside_ndarray)
{ {
if (inside_ndarray)
{
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read,
exception_message(input_format, "ndarray can not be recursive", "size"), nullptr));
}
result.second |= (1 << 8); // use bit 8 to indicate ndarray, all UBJSON and BJData markers should be ASCII letters result.second |= (1 << 8); // use bit 8 to indicate ndarray, all UBJSON and BJData markers should be ASCII letters
} }
return is_error; return is_error;
@@ -2525,7 +2548,7 @@ class binary_reader
if (current == '#') if (current == '#')
{ {
const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray); const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray);
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray) if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray && !inside_ndarray)
{ {
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read, return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read,
exception_message(input_format, "ndarray requires both type and size", "size"), nullptr)); exception_message(input_format, "ndarray requires both type and size", "size"), nullptr));
@@ -2796,6 +2819,17 @@ class binary_reader
if (size_and_type.first != npos) if (size_and_type.first != npos)
{ {
// reading an element of a valueless type consumes no input, so the
// declared count alone decides how much is allocated; the check is
// made before the start event so that no container is opened that
// is then abandoned. See @ref max_valueless_container_size.
if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY((size_and_type.second == 'Z' || size_and_type.second == 'T' || size_and_type.second == 'F')
&& size_and_type.first > max_valueless_container_size))
{
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), out_of_range::create(408,
exception_message(input_format, "excessive array size", "size"), nullptr));
}
if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY(!sax->start_array(size_and_type.first))) if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY(!sax->start_array(size_and_type.first)))
{ {
return false; return false;
@@ -826,7 +826,17 @@ class binary_writer
std::vector<CharType> bjdx = {'[', '{', 'S', 'H', 'T', 'F', 'N', 'Z'}; // excluded markers in bjdata optimized type std::vector<CharType> bjdx = {'[', '{', 'S', 'H', 'T', 'F', 'N', 'Z'}; // excluded markers in bjdata optimized type
if (same_prefix && !(use_bjdata && std::find(bjdx.begin(), bjdx.end(), first_prefix) != bjdx.end())) // an optimized array of a valueless type carries no payload, so a
// reader has nothing but the declared count to bound the allocation
// by and refuses an excessive one. Write the unoptimized form for
// those, at one byte per element, so the result can be read back.
// Objects are not affected: every element is preceded by its key.
const bool valueless_type = (first_prefix == 'Z' || first_prefix == 'T' || first_prefix == 'F');
const bool excessive_valueless = valueless_type
&& j.m_data.m_value.array->size() > detail::max_valueless_container_size;
if (same_prefix && !excessive_valueless
&& !(use_bjdata && std::find(bjdx.begin(), bjdx.end(), first_prefix) != bjdx.end()))
{ {
prefix_required = false; prefix_required = false;
oa->write_character(to_char_type('$')); oa->write_character(to_char_type('$'));
+53 -9
View File
@@ -10745,6 +10745,26 @@ inline bool little_endianness(int num = 1) noexcept
return *reinterpret_cast<char*>(&num) == 1; return *reinterpret_cast<char*>(&num) == 1;
} }
/*!
@brief largest element count accepted for a UBJSON container of a valueless type
An element of type 'Z' (null), 'T' (true) or 'F' (false) is encoded by its
type marker alone, so an optimized container of one of those types has no
payload at all and its declared count is the only thing that decides how much
is allocated: `[$Z#L` followed by a large count turns some ten bytes of input
into that many values (see #2793, which reports 35 GB and 150 seconds). Every
other type costs at least one byte per element and is bounded by the end of
the input.
This is a sanity bound rather than a security boundary, and it is far above
any container met in practice. @ref binary_writer falls back to the
unoptimized encoding for longer containers, so that a value serialized by
this library can always be read back.
@sa https://github.com/nlohmann/json/issues/2793
*/
JSON_INLINE_VARIABLE constexpr std::size_t max_valueless_container_size = 1 << 20;
/////////////////// ///////////////////
// binary reader // // binary reader //
/////////////////// ///////////////////
@@ -13164,7 +13184,12 @@ class binary_reader
{ {
result.first = npos; // size result.first = npos; // size
result.second = 0; // type result.second = 0; // type
bool is_ndarray = false; // seed the flag with the caller's context: inside an ndarray dimension
// vector another ndarray is not allowed, and get_ubjson_size_value()
// rejects it up front instead of reading it and reporting afterwards.
// Seeding it with `false` made every '#' of a "[#[#[..." chain descend
// another level, which overflowed the stack (see #5104).
bool is_ndarray = inside_ndarray;
get_ignore_noop(); get_ignore_noop();
@@ -13197,13 +13222,11 @@ class binary_reader
} }
const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray); const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray);
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray) // an ndarray was read here only if the flag flipped; when it was
// seeded true, get_ubjson_size_value() already rejected the nested
// dimension vector
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray && !inside_ndarray)
{ {
if (inside_ndarray)
{
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read,
exception_message(input_format, "ndarray can not be recursive", "size"), nullptr));
}
result.second |= (1 << 8); // use bit 8 to indicate ndarray, all UBJSON and BJData markers should be ASCII letters result.second |= (1 << 8); // use bit 8 to indicate ndarray, all UBJSON and BJData markers should be ASCII letters
} }
return is_error; return is_error;
@@ -13212,7 +13235,7 @@ class binary_reader
if (current == '#') if (current == '#')
{ {
const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray); const bool is_error = get_ubjson_size_value(result.first, is_ndarray);
if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray) if (input_format == input_format_t::bjdata && is_ndarray && !inside_ndarray)
{ {
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read, return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), parse_error::create(112, chars_read,
exception_message(input_format, "ndarray requires both type and size", "size"), nullptr)); exception_message(input_format, "ndarray requires both type and size", "size"), nullptr));
@@ -13483,6 +13506,17 @@ class binary_reader
if (size_and_type.first != npos) if (size_and_type.first != npos)
{ {
// reading an element of a valueless type consumes no input, so the
// declared count alone decides how much is allocated; the check is
// made before the start event so that no container is opened that
// is then abandoned. See @ref max_valueless_container_size.
if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY((size_and_type.second == 'Z' || size_and_type.second == 'T' || size_and_type.second == 'F')
&& size_and_type.first > max_valueless_container_size))
{
return sax->parse_error(chars_read, get_token_string(), out_of_range::create(408,
exception_message(input_format, "excessive array size", "size"), nullptr));
}
if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY(!sax->start_array(size_and_type.first))) if (JSON_HEDLEY_UNLIKELY(!sax->start_array(size_and_type.first)))
{ {
return false; return false;
@@ -17920,7 +17954,17 @@ class binary_writer
std::vector<CharType> bjdx = {'[', '{', 'S', 'H', 'T', 'F', 'N', 'Z'}; // excluded markers in bjdata optimized type std::vector<CharType> bjdx = {'[', '{', 'S', 'H', 'T', 'F', 'N', 'Z'}; // excluded markers in bjdata optimized type
if (same_prefix && !(use_bjdata && std::find(bjdx.begin(), bjdx.end(), first_prefix) != bjdx.end())) // an optimized array of a valueless type carries no payload, so a
// reader has nothing but the declared count to bound the allocation
// by and refuses an excessive one. Write the unoptimized form for
// those, at one byte per element, so the result can be read back.
// Objects are not affected: every element is preceded by its key.
const bool valueless_type = (first_prefix == 'Z' || first_prefix == 'T' || first_prefix == 'F');
const bool excessive_valueless = valueless_type
&& j.m_data.m_value.array->size() > detail::max_valueless_container_size;
if (same_prefix && !excessive_valueless
&& !(use_bjdata && std::find(bjdx.begin(), bjdx.end(), first_prefix) != bjdx.end()))
{ {
prefix_required = false; prefix_required = false;
oa->write_character(to_char_type('$')); oa->write_character(to_char_type('$'));
+18 -3
View File
@@ -3288,8 +3288,10 @@ TEST_CASE("BJData")
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR1), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&); CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR1), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 6: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR1, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR1, true, false).is_discarded());
// a dimension vector that opens another one is rejected where the
// nested '[' is read, rather than after it has been descended into
std::vector<uint8_t> const vR2 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '#', '[', 'i', 1, ']', ']', 1}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vR2 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '#', '[', 'i', 1, ']', ']', 1};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR2), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 11: syntax error while parsing BJData size: expected length type specification (U, i, u, I, m, l, M, L) after '#'; last byte: 0x5D", json::parse_error&); CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR2), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 7: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR2, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR2, true, false).is_discarded());
std::vector<uint8_t> const vR3 = {'[', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vR3 = {'[', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'};
@@ -3297,7 +3299,7 @@ TEST_CASE("BJData")
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR3, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR3, true, false).is_discarded());
std::vector<uint8_t> const vR4 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', 1, ']', 1}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vR4 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', 1, ']', 1};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR4), "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 14: syntax error while parsing BJData number: unexpected end of input", json::parse_error&); CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR4), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 9: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR4, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR4, true, false).is_discarded());
std::vector<uint8_t> const vR5 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '[', '[', ']', ']', ']'}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vR5 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '[', '[', ']', ']', ']'};
@@ -3305,12 +3307,25 @@ TEST_CASE("BJData")
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR5, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR5, true, false).is_discarded());
std::vector<uint8_t> const vR6 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vR6 = {'[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR6), "[json.exception.parse_error.112] parse error at byte 14: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray can not be recursive", json::parse_error&); CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vR6), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 9: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR6, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vR6, true, false).is_discarded());
std::vector<uint8_t> const vH = {'[', 'H', '[', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'}; std::vector<uint8_t> const vH = {'[', 'H', '[', '#', '[', '$', 'i', '#', '[', 'i', '2', 'i', 2, ']'};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vH), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 3: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&); CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vH), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 3: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vH, true, false).is_discarded()); CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vH, true, false).is_discarded());
// Every "#[" of this chain used to open another dimension vector
// and cost several stack frames before anything was rejected, so a
// long enough chain crashed the process (see #5104). The nested
// vector is refused where it is read, so the length is irrelevant.
std::vector<uint8_t> vRdeep = {'['};
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < 100000; ++i)
{
vRdeep.push_back('#');
vRdeep.push_back('[');
}
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_bjdata(vRdeep), "[json.exception.parse_error.113] parse error at byte 5: syntax error while parsing BJData size: ndarray dimensional vector is not allowed", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_bjdata(vRdeep, true, false).is_discarded());
} }
SECTION("objects") SECTION("objects")
+61
View File
@@ -2149,6 +2149,67 @@ TEST_CASE("UBJSON")
} }
} }
TEST_CASE("UBJSON optimized arrays of a valueless type are bounded")
{
// An element of type 'Z', 'T' or 'F' is encoded by its marker alone, so an
// optimized array of one of those has no payload and the declared count is
// the only thing deciding how much is allocated. Ten bytes used to produce
// billions of values (#2793); every other type costs at least one byte per
// element and is bounded by the end of the input.
json _;
SECTION("an excessive count is rejected")
{
// 'l' is a big-endian int32: 0x7FFFFFFF elements, about 34 GB of value
for (const auto marker :
{'Z', 'T', 'F'
})
{
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', static_cast<uint8_t>(marker), '#', 'l', 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_ubjson(input), "[json.exception.out_of_range.408] syntax error while parsing UBJSON size: excessive array size", json::out_of_range&);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
}
SECTION("ordinary counts are unaffected")
{
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(std::vector<uint8_t>({'[', '$', 'Z', '#', 'i', 3})) == json({nullptr, nullptr, nullptr}));
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(std::vector<uint8_t>({'[', '$', 'T', '#', 'i', 2})) == json({true, true}));
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(std::vector<uint8_t>({'[', '$', 'F', '#', 'i', 2})) == json({false, false}));
// 'N' is a no-op rather than a value, and still yields an empty array
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(std::vector<uint8_t>({'[', '$', 'N', '#', 'i', 2})) == json::array());
}
SECTION("a type with a payload is unaffected")
{
// A count past the limit is not rejected for 'U', which costs a byte
// per element and is bounded by the end of the input instead. The
// count is kept just past the limit rather than made huge, because a
// count that also exceeds the array's max_size() is reported as
// out_of_range before the input runs out, and max_size() depends on
// the width of std::size_t.
const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '$', 'U', '#', 'l', 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01};
CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_ubjson(input), "[json.exception.parse_error.110] parse error at byte 10: syntax error while parsing UBJSON number: unexpected end of input", json::parse_error&);
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(input, true, false).is_discarded());
}
SECTION("the writer stays within what the reader accepts")
{
// below the limit the optimized form is used and is tiny; above it the
// writer falls back so that the result can still be read back
json const at_limit(1048576, nullptr);
const auto v_at_limit = json::to_ubjson(at_limit, true, true);
CHECK(v_at_limit.size() == 9);
CHECK(v_at_limit.at(1) == '$');
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(v_at_limit) == at_limit);
json const above_limit(1048577, nullptr);
const auto v_above_limit = json::to_ubjson(above_limit, true, true);
CHECK(v_above_limit.at(1) != '$');
CHECK(json::from_ubjson(v_above_limit) == above_limit);
}
}
TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1") TEST_CASE("Universal Binary JSON Specification Examples 1")
{ {
SECTION("Null Value") SECTION("Null Value")