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parsedmarc/tests/test_splunk.py
2ee209005b Merge commit from fork
* chore: update IPinfo Lite MMDB (#941)

Co-authored-by: seanthegeek <44679+seanthegeek@users.noreply.github.com>

* Cap report date range and indexes created per report

A report whose <date_range> spans millions of days was normalized into one
record per day, exhausting memory, and with Elasticsearch or OpenSearch
output created one dated index (one shard) per day, exhausting the
cluster's shard budget.

Reject a range longer than MAX_REPORT_SPAN_DAYS (366) or negative with
InvalidAggregateReport. In both save functions, once a report has used
MAX_INDEXES_PER_REPORT (31) distinct dated indexes, route further records
to the report's first index, keeping their own dates, and log one warning.

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Catch output-stage exceptions and validate SMTP TLS report types

One report sent to a monitored mailbox could make a configured output
raise an exception that process_reports() did not catch. It escaped
through the mailbox save callback, _main logged "Mailbox Error" and
exited 1, and the batch stayed in the mailbox, so every one-shot run
died on the same message and duplicated the legitimate reports in
non-deduplicating outputs. Three sender-controlled inputs did it:

- A failure report whose sample has an empty From:, To: or Reply-To:
  (To: undisclosed-recipients:; included): mail-parser gives an empty
  address list, and the Elasticsearch and OpenSearch saves indexed
  [0] (IndexError).
- An SMTP TLS report with a wrong-typed field: "policy-string": [1]
  made the CSV writer raise TypeError; "start-datetime": 5 made the
  Elasticsearch, OpenSearch and Splunk saves raise AttributeError and
  _ensure_utc_suffix() in the PostgreSQL save raise TypeError.
- An aggregate report whose <reason> has no <type> (KeyError in the
  CSV writer) or a <type> that xmltodict parses to a dict or a list
  (TypeError in its join).

Fix:

- Every output destination block in process_reports() now ends with
  the catch-all the aggregate Elasticsearch block had: the failure and
  SMTP TLS Elasticsearch/OpenSearch blocks, every PostgreSQL and
  Splunk HEC block, and the file output (its OSError/ValueError branch
  is kept). The error goes through log_output_error(), so the batch is
  reported unsaved and fail_on_output_error still raises ParserError.
- parse_smtp_tls_report_json() and its helpers check each field
  against the type RFC 8460 section 4.4 gives it and raise
  InvalidSMTPTLSReport otherwise: strings for organization-name,
  report-id, policy-domain, policy-type, result-type and the optional
  failure-details fields; contact-info a string or a list of strings;
  policy-string and a list mx-host-pattern lists of strings; the
  session counts integers or null; failure-details a list of objects;
  start-datetime and end-datetime strings of at most 64 characters that
  the outputs' own conversions accept. dateutil took 12.4 s to fail on
  a 1,000,000-digit date, hence the length bound.
- _parse_report_record() makes a reason's type and comment a string or
  None (a dict unwrapped with _text(), a list as its str()), and the
  aggregate CSV writer reads both with .get().
- The Elasticsearch and OpenSearch failure saves flatten From, To and
  Reply-To with a helper that returns None for an empty list, and
  leave such a header out of the document and the duplicate query.
- The Splunk SMTP TLS save converts begin_date inside its try, so a bad
  value raises SplunkError; _ensure_utc_suffix() returns a non-string
  unchanged.

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Limit XML nesting depth and node count in aggregate reports

parse_aggregate_report_xml() gave the decompressed report (up to the
100 MiB decompression cap) to xmltodict with no limit on depth or element
count. xmltodict keeps one stack entry per open element and expat reports
missing end tags only at the end of the input, so a few KB of gzipped
unclosed <a> tags grew to gigabytes of RSS and the kernel OOM killer
ended the process before the message was moved; a wide document of
millions of siblings did the same at a smaller scale. A failed first
parse also re-parsed the document through lxml recovery, which has no
node limit, and a second xmltodict pass.

_NoDoctypeExpat.ParserCreate() now returns a proxy around the expat
parser. pyexpat parsers cannot be subclassed and xmltodict assigns its
handlers after ParserCreate() returns, so the proxy's __setattr__ wraps
StartElementHandler to count depth and nodes (elements plus attributes)
and EndElementHandler to decrement depth, and forwards every other
attribute. Over MAX_XML_DEPTH (100) or MAX_XML_NODES (5,000,000) it
raises before xmltodict's handler runs. Both xmltodict.parse() call
sites turn that into InvalidAggregateReport naming the limit; the first
does so instead of trying lxml recovery.

The lxml recovery path now runs a counting pass first, with a parser
target that builds no tree and counts elements, attributes and
namespace declarations against MAX_XML_NODES; the tree is built only
for a document within the limit. Depth there is bounded by libxml2's
own limit of 256 (huge_tree stays off) and then by the second
xmltodict pass. A 22 MiB wide document behind a malformed XML
declaration peaked at +1532 MiB before this pass and +23 MiB after.

The largest aggregate sample (909 KB) has 32,019 nodes, so a legitimate
report at the 100 MiB cap stays near 3.6 million.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Create Elasticsearch/OpenSearch indexes with mapping guards

create_indexes() and create_data_streams() created indexes and the data
stream template with settings only, so the cluster typed every report
field from the first document that held it, with date_detection on. A
sender could be first into a day's index (its name comes from the
report) and poison it: a report_id of "2026-11-09" mapped report_id as a
date, a failure sample header named "Subject.x" mapped
sample.headers.subject as an object, and samples with invented header
names used up index.mapping.total_fields.limit. Every later legitimate
report for that index was then rejected and ended up in Unsaved; in data
stream mode this lasted until a rollover.

Both functions now take a mappings body, and the three save functions
pass one per report type. Each turns date_detection off and declares the
fields that hold dates (@timestamp, date_range, date_begin, date_end,
arrival_date, sample.date) as dates, the type date detection gave them
before; on the sample reports every other field keeps its old type. The failure mapping
maps sample.headers as an object with dynamic: false and declares, as
text with a keyword sub-field (the dynamic string default), every header
the shipped dashboards reference plus date, message-id and cc; all
headers still stay in _source. A "." in a header name is replaced with
"_" before the header is stored. The index is now created through the
client's indices.create with the settings and mappings body, because
opensearch-py's Index.create cannot take a mappings argument; the data
stream template merges the mappings with its @timestamp date mapping.

Existing indexes are not changed. The other report fields stay dynamic
and object-mapped (no nested), which the dashboards need (issue #169).

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Read the RFC 8460 mx-host key in SMTP TLS reports

RFC 8460 section 4.4 keys a policy's MX host patterns "mx-host"; its
schema line is "mx-host": mx-host-pattern, where mx-host-pattern is the
value type, described as "a JSON array of strings", and the RFC's
Appendix B example gives the value as a plain string. The parser read
only "mx-host-pattern", so every RFC-conformant report lost the field
(samples/smtp_tls/rfc8460.json, the Appendix B example, among them).

_parse_smtp_tls_report_policy() now reads "mx-host" as a string or a
list of strings, a string becoming a one-element list, and falls back
to "mx-host-pattern" (same rules) when "mx-host" is absent, null or
empty. Any other type raises InvalidSMTPTLSReport. The output key is
still mx_host_patterns, so the PostgreSQL TEXT[] column, the
Elasticsearch/OpenSearch field and the CSV column are unchanged.

Refs #942

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reject over-limit messages with the mailsuite guard

parse_report_email() and parse_email() handed every message to
mail-parser and the email package with no bound on blank lines, header
lines, header field size, MIME parts or nested multiparts, so a small
crafted message took seconds to minutes and gigabytes to parse while the
rest of the mailbox waited.

Both now call mailsuite.utils.check_message_limits() first, one linear
pass. parse_report_email() turns MessageLimitExceeded into
InvalidDMARCReport so the mailbox loop files the message under Invalid;
parse_failure_report() turns one from the sample into InvalidFailureReport.
The mailsuite floor rises to 2.3.5, which adds the guard.

Messages nested deeper than 100 multiparts are now rejected by the guard
instead of reaching the recursion handler; the tests that used the
400-level message expect the new message.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Cite RFC 7489 §6.3 for the daily report interval

The comment on MAX_REPORT_SPAN_DAYS cited RFC 7489 Appendix A for the
one-day aggregate report. The daily interval comes from §6.3: the "ri"
tag requests the interval between aggregate reports, and its default is
86400 seconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Add the 11.2.2 changelog: five advisories and #942

One Security bullet per advisory (GHSA-qcc2, GHSA-q7gm, GHSA-p85v,
GHSA-4272, GHSA-qpcg) and a Bug fixes bullet for the RFC 8460 mx-host
key. The version in constants.py is bumped by the release pull request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Keep the date range rejection message and pyright's analysis

With the XML limits and the date range limit merged,
parse_aggregate_report_xml() became too complex for pyright to analyze
("Code is too complex to analyze"), and the date range rejection,
raised inside the function's catch-all, reached the caller as
"Unexpected error: Report date range spans ...".

The date range check moves to _check_report_span() and the second
xmltodict pass to _parse_limited_xml(), which raises the XML limit
breach as InvalidAggregateReport; the catch-all now re-raises an
InvalidAggregateReport as it is. The tests assert the message is not
re-wrapped.

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Put the over-limit failure samples in a delivery-status body

mailsuite 2.3.5's check_message_limits() follows the MIME structure and
counts blank lines only inside message/delivery-status bodies, the shape
whose parse cost is per blank line; blank lines elsewhere in a body are
not limited. The two failure-sample tests used blank lines in a plain
body, which the final check accepts, so they now put them in a
delivery-status body. parsedmarc's call with the default limits is
unchanged.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Describe the final mailsuite check and the index cap in the docs

The GHSA-qcc2 changelog bullet now describes check_message_limits() as
mailsuite 2.3.5 ships it: limits follow the MIME structure, and body
lines outside message/delivery-status bodies are not limited. The
changelog section moves to Unreleased, as parsedmarc's AGENTS.md has
fix pull requests write it; the release pull request names the version.

The Elasticsearch and OpenSearch pages now say that an address header
with no address is left out of the failure document, and that a report
spanning more than 31 days saves its later records to its first dated
index.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Bound records times days in normalization and fix the span message

The date range limit bounds how far one record is split, but not how
many records are split: 10,000 records over 366 days, each with a count
of 1,000,000 (3.3 MB of XML), produced 3,670,000 records in 13.5 s and
1.7 GB, and 30,000 of them (a 44 KB gzip) ran out of memory and reached
the caller as "Unexpected error: ". A report whose split would exceed
MAX_NORMALIZED_RECORDS (250,000) now keeps its records whole over its own
range, with timespan_requires_normalization false and one warning; a
large legitimate multi-day report is kept rather than rejected. The
record loop moves to _parse_report_records() so pyright can still
analyze parse_aggregate_report_xml().

The span message used float division, which raises OverflowError for an
<end> of 4,001 digits; it now uses integer division. The index-routing
warning escapes the sender's report ID with sanitize_for_log(). The
changelog and the Elasticsearch and OpenSearch pages say the index cap
is per report, that dated index names still come from report dates, and
that data streams are affected by neither.

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Drop XML attributes from aggregate reports before they are used

xmltodict turns an element with an attribute, such as <p a="1">none</p>,
into {"@a": "1", "#text": "none"}. Such objects passed through the
parser into Elasticsearch and OpenSearch documents for version, p, fo,
disposition, envelope_to and other scalar fields, so the first one mapped
the field as an object and every later report to that index failed, and
hundreds of attributes on one element used up total_fields.limit. The
parsed report now goes through one linear pass that replaces an element
with only attributes and text by its text and drops attributes from the
others; the existing _text() calls now receive strings.

The changelog and the Elasticsearch and OpenSearch pages also say that
an existing data stream's next backing index gets the guarded mappings,
since parsedmarc puts the template again in every process, and the
indexed-header comment and changelog name cc as the one header added to
those the dashboards reference.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reject lone surrogates in SMTP TLS reports and guard the stdout print

An SMTP TLS string field holding a lone surrogate (JSON "\ud800")
passed every type check and survived json.dumps(ensure_ascii=False), and
print(output_str) in process_reports(), outside every try, raised
UnicodeEncodeError: parsedmarc exited 1, and in mailbox mode the error
escaped the save callback. RFC 8460 section 4 reports are I-JSON, whose RFC
7493 section 2.1 forbids surrogate code points, so the string and
string-list checks now reject one as InvalidSMTPTLSReport, and the print
records a UnicodeEncodeError as a "Standard output" output error.

The _smtp_tls_datetime() docstring no longer says a parsed date cannot
fail in any output: dateutil accepts partial dates that PostgreSQL may
reject, which is contained as PostgreSQLError. The _reason_text()
docstring says a dict with child elements gives None.

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Describe mailsuite 2.3.5's address group handling in the changelog

The final mailsuite 2.3.5 no longer rejects an address header by its
comma count; its parse_email() removes RFC 5322 group syntax from address
header values over 8 KiB before parsing them. The boundary limit
counts lines that are the boundary of an open multipart. parsedmarc's
call with the default limits is unchanged.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Test the keep-alive call of the extracted record loop

_parse_report_records() holds the record loop moved out of
parse_aggregate_report_xml(); its keep-alive branch had no test.

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Test a policy override type with child elements

With XML attributes dropped at parse time, a dict reaches _reason_text()
only for an element with child elements; the test pins its None result
and the CSV's "none".

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Check plain-string contact-info and mx-host for lone surrogates

The surrogate check covered the string fields and string lists, but a
contact-info or mx-host given as one string took a branch that skipped
it, and a lone surrogate there still made the stdout print raise.

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Say which sample headers the failure document leaves out

The GHSA-qpcg changelog bullet said every sample header stays in
_source, but the failure save leaves out a From, To or Reply-To header
that holds no address, as the Elasticsearch and OpenSearch pages say.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Keep sender-derived numbers out of the date range message

The rejection message printed the report's span in days, so an <end> of
thousands of digits put a number of thousands of digits into the
exception text and the log. It now says only that the range is negative
or longer than MAX_REPORT_SPAN_DAYS.

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Store every string-typed aggregate field as a string or null

Dropping attributes did not cover child elements: <version><x>1</x></version>,
<p><x>1</x></p> or <p>none<x/></p> still reached the parsed report, and the
Elasticsearch and OpenSearch documents, as a dict, and the first such
document mapped the field as an object. _scalar() now makes each field the
schema types as a string a string (an element's own text) or None, applied
by _scalarize_report() to version, the report_metadata strings and every
policy_published child, and by _parse_report_record() to source_ip,
disposition, dkim, spf, the identifiers and every auth_results string. A
<count> with no text of its own takes the ValueError path of a non-numeric
count. _drop_xml_attributes() stays, so a field missed here still loses
its attribute keys.

The <email> dict unwrap is gone, since the field can no longer be a dict;
a text-only report_metadata still raises the AttributeError that reports
a missing section. Comments that described attribute dicts now say the
dict shape comes only from child elements. The namespace test, which the
new code could not fail, is replaced by one that detects RFC 9990 through
an attributed np field.

Tests walk the to_dict() of a mocked Elasticsearch and OpenSearch save and
allow lists and objects only in the known object fields, so a scalar field
added later is covered too.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Record a closed stdout pipe as an output error and fix two comments

The standard-output guard in process_reports() caught only
UnicodeEncodeError, so a closed pipe (BrokenPipeError, an OSError) still
ended the run; it now records both as a "Standard output" output error.

_reason_text()'s docstring said a dict gives None because the element has
no text of its own, but mixed content (<type>forwarded<x/></type>) gives
the text beside the children; the docstring now says what the code does,
and a test pins it. The comment above the reason normalization no longer
describes attribute dicts, which no longer reach it.

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Test the normalization limit at its boundary and reword the index cap

The suite passed with the limit's <= changed to < and with
_days_touched()'s ceiling changed to a floor. New tests: 1,000 records
over 250 days (exactly MAX_NORMALIZED_RECORDS) are split; 683 records
over 366 days (249,978) are split and 684 (250,344) are not; 682 records
over 366 days starting 1 s after midnight touch 367 days (250,294) and
are not split. Each mutant was run against these tests and fails: the <
mutant fails the exact-limit test, the floor mutant the after-midnight
test.

The Elasticsearch and OpenSearch pages now say the index cap applies
when a report's records would use more than 31 dated indexes, which is
what it counts (with monthly_indexes the span limit keeps a report under
it).

Refs GHSA-p85v-578x-3wcf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Match the tests and changelog to mailsuite 2.3.5's final check

mailsuite 2.3.5's check_message_limits() now parses the message with
the email package's own feed parser under compat32 and counts the parts
it creates (each message/delivery-status block among them), their
nesting depth and its boundary tests, then limits header field length
and count on the parsed tree; the limit names changed. The over-limit
failure samples now trip max_parts, and the deeply nested poison message
max_depth; the tests assert those texts. The GHSA-qcc2 changelog bullet
describes the final check, the epilogue mail-parser parses again, and
the changes that affect only mailsuite's own parse_email().

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Test a repeated policy_published and note mixed-content behaviour

No test failed when _scalarize_report() stopped coercing the fields of a
repeated <policy_published> (the list case): with that mutant, a report
with two policy_published elements and <p><x>1</x></p> puts a dict into
published_policy.p. The parse test and the Elasticsearch and OpenSearch
document-walk tests now include that report; each fails on the mutant.

The changelog says that an element with text and a stray child element
now yields its text (samples/aggregate/invalid_xml.xml gives header_from
"bad" where it gave ""). AGENTS.md and the _normalize_result_word() and
_scalarize_report() docstrings describe what runs now: attributes are
dropped as soon as the XML is parsed, and _scalar() coerces the string
fields, among them the RFC 7489 and RFC 9990 policy_published fields.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Coerce policy override reasons with the same rule as other strings

_reason_text() turned a repeated <type> or <comment> into the str() of
the list, while _scalar() turns every other repeated string field into
None. One class of input now has one rule: the reason's type and comment
go through _scalar(), so a repeated one is None ("none" in CSV), and
_reason_text() is removed. The test and the GHSA-4272 changelog bullet
say so.

Refs GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Test an aggregate <error> with a child element

With attributes dropped and reasons coerced by _scalar(), only <error>,
which may repeat, still reaches _text() with a dict; its branch had no
test. An <error> with text beside a child element keeps the text, and
one with no text is dropped.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Describe mailsuite's six message limits in the changelog

mailsuite 2.3.5's check now counts every line of every header block
(folded lines and lines the parser keeps only as defects included) and
stops the parse early, and limits the total length of the address
headers mail-parser parses to 262,144 characters. The GHSA-qcc2 bullet
names the six limits.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Render a report email's parts only where their text is read

parse_report_email() did str(payload_obj[0]) for every part walk()
visits, before the multipart/ continue. str() of a composite part
renders its whole subtree, and walk() visits every level, so a nesting
within mailsuite's limits rendered its leaf once per level: 98 nested
multiparts around a 20 MiB one-line leaf took 26.6 s, and a chain of 99
message/rfc822 parts around a 10 MiB leaf 11.3 s. A part is now rendered
only in the branches that read it; other message/* bodies are skipped,
since walk() visits their parts. Both shapes now take under 0.5 s, and
every sample under samples/failure/ parses to the same output.

A feedback report's sample is taken from the first sample part only: a
message/rfc822 nested inside the sample used to replace it, but a
feedback report has one sample (RFC 6591 section 3.1). Multipart nesting
alone no longer reaches the recursion limit, so the GHSA-qxwv test now
reaches the recursion guard through a deeply nested sample, which is
still rendered.

The changelog describes this and the address headers mailsuite 2.3.5
counts (From, Sender, Reply-To, To, Cc, Bcc, Delivered-To, in every
part; mail-parser parses all but Sender).

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Parse aggregate XML without attributes and lower the node limit

_drop_xml_attributes() rebuilt the parsed tree while the original was
alive, and the counting wrappers of _LimitedExpatParser referred to the
proxy, closing a reference cycle through the expat parser that kept
xmltodict's tree alive until the cyclic garbage collector ran. Both
xmltodict passes now use xml_attribs=False, so no attribute key is ever
built (expat still hands the attributes to the start handler, so they
are still counted: a test shows one element with 1,000 attributes is
1,001 nodes), _drop_xml_attributes() is removed, and the counts live in
an _XMLCounts object the wrappers share, so a parse leaves no cycle (a
test asserts gc.collect() finds nothing after one).

Peak extra memory for 2,000,000 distinct sibling elements: +999 MiB
before, +386 MiB after (master +391 MiB); for one element with 2,000,000
attributes: +1,274 MiB before, +445 MiB after (master +734 MiB).

At the old limit of 5,000,000 nodes a report could still need about 3 GB.
Measured after the change, the worst shape is distinct elements with
text behind a malformed XML declaration (the lxml recovery path): 559
bytes per node, +533 MiB for 999,000 nodes and +1,023 MiB for 2,000,000;
on the expat path about 220 bytes per node. MAX_XML_NODES is now
1,000,000, so a report at the limit needs at most about 550 MiB; the
largest sample has 32,019 nodes (909 KB), and the limit is a report of
about 28 MB. The constant's comment and the changelog state the bound.

AGENTS.md describes the attribute handling as it now is, and says that
<error>, which may repeat, goes through _text() and stays a list.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Qualify the mixed-content compatibility note to string fields

An element with text beside a stray child element yields its text only
for the fields the schema types as strings; a <begin> or <end> with mixed
content is still rejected, as before.

Refs GHSA-qpcg-29vr-jwm3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reject over-long XML tags before any parser reads them

expat and libxml2 build a start tag's whole attribute list before they
report the element, so the node counter only sees the attributes after
they cost memory: one element with 4,999,000 attributes (56 MiB) took
5.25 s and +767 MiB before the node limit rejected it, and a single
element is bounded only by the 100 MiB decompression cap.

parse_aggregate_report_xml() now scans the decoded text once, before the
first parse and so before the lxml recovery path too, and rejects a
document in which any text between a "<" and the next ">" (or the end
of the text) is longer than MAX_XML_TAG_LENGTH (65,536 characters). The
scan uses no regex. It splits the text on ">" one 64 KiB chunk at a time,
carrying the unfinished piece from its last "<": a single split of the
whole text makes one string per tag, which peaked at +1,318 MiB (1.9 s)
for 100 MiB of "<a/>"; the chunked scan needs about 2 MiB and takes
0.6 s on that text, and a test bounds its memory and covers a tag across
a chunk boundary. The longest tag in the samples is 108 characters. The same shape
is now rejected in under 0.1 s, with a tracemalloc peak under 200 MB in the
test, behind a well-formed or a malformed declaration.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Render a report email's feedback-report part only once

The message/* skip exempted message/feedback-report, which was rendered
with str() every time walk() reached one: a chain of 99 nested
message/feedback-report parts around a 10 MiB leaf passed mailsuite's
check in 0.02 s and then took 11.6 s. A feedback report has one
message/feedback-report part (RFC 6591 section 3), so, as with the
sample, only the first is read and rendered; the chain now takes 0.56 s.
The failure samples parse to byte-identical output.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Bound attribute counts by their = signs and cap reports at 32 MiB

XML allows a raw > inside a quoted attribute value, so attributes such as
x=">" cut a tag into short pieces that pass the tag scan: 4,999,000 of
them cost 5.61 s and +781 MiB, and 8,000,000 (98 MiB) 8.9 s and
+1,215 MiB, before the node limit fired. Every attribute needs an =, so
a document with more = characters than MAX_XML_NODES is now rejected in
one str.count() pass, before the tag scan; the samples hold at most 3.
The tag scan stays for long tags, and its docstring says it does not
bound attribute counts.

The stated memory bound was false: text per node is bounded only by the
size of the report, so at the node limit with 80 characters per element
(94 MiB) the recovery path reached +827 MiB. MAX_DECOMPRESSED_REPORT_SIZE
falls from 100 MiB to 32 MiB (the node limit already means a legitimate
report is at most about 28 MB, at the samples' 35 nodes per KB, and the
largest sample is 909 KB), and parse_aggregate_report_xml() holds an
uncompressed report to the same length, so the bound holds for every
input. Measured at the cap, 999,000 distinct elements with 14 characters
of text (31 MiB) need +587 MiB on the recovery path and +302 MiB on the
expat path; the constant comment and the changelog state it.

When the first parse fails, the exception's traceback kept the partial
xmltodict tree alive while the recovery parse ran; it is cleared first
(+603 to +587 MiB, and +263 to +241 MiB for 330,000 elements of 80
characters). A test shows the recovery path leaves the same 18 lxml
helper objects for a document ten times larger, so no tree survives a
parse there either.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Let the RFC 6591 feedback part win over legacy report text

The guard that reads only the first message/feedback-report part tested
feedback_report, which the legacy text/plain branch ("A message claiming
to be from you has failed ... detected.") also sets, so a legacy text
part followed by a real feedback-report part and sample now took the
legacy part and never read the ARF, where master read the ARF. The
guard now tests is_feedback_report, and reading the feedback-report part
discards a sample a legacy part set before it.

The same rule closes an older gap: a text/plain part inside the sample,
which is the spoofed message's own text, could hold the legacy phrase and
replace the report's Source-IP and its sample. Once a feedback-report
part is read, the legacy branch is skipped; a legacy report has no such
part. Tests cover both orders and the in-sample case; the failure
samples parse to byte-identical output.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Hold every report input to the size cap and free failed parses

parse_report_file() kept the aggregate parser's exception, whose
traceback holds the parser's frames and the parsed tree, while it tried
SMTP TLS and then the email parser: a 31 MiB file at the cap cost
+1,046 MiB there against +587 MiB parsing it directly. It now keeps only
each failure's text and raises from a fresh exception of the relevant
format, so the chain survives without the tree. A file that begins with
"<" is not tried as JSON (json.loads() decoded it all) or as an email,
one that begins with "{" is not tried as an email (an RFC 822 message
begins with a header line), and text over the size cap is never handed
to the email parser, which has none: a 200 MiB <x/> file reached
+2,801 MiB in 4.6 s and now costs +232 MiB (reading the file) in 0.05 s.
extract_report() reads an uncompressed report at most one byte past the
cap instead of decoding it whole.

The cap counted characters for text and bytes for compressed reports,
so a non-ASCII report could be four times the cap in bytes: 999,000
elements of 14 emoji (31.2 Mi characters, 71 MiB of UTF-8) cost +649 MiB.
_exceeds_size_cap() measures text as UTF-8 (ASCII by length, other text
1 MiB of characters at a time, without a full copy), and bytes are
checked before they are decoded.

Clearing e.__traceback__ inside the except block did nothing on Python
3.10, which keeps the handled exception's traceback while the handler
runs. The lxml recovery now runs after the except block, in
_recover_xml(), so the first parse's frames and partial tree are
unreachable when it starts on every supported Python; a test holds a
weak reference to the first parse's counter and fails on the old code
under Python 3.10.19 and, with the clearing removed, under 3.14.

The changelog's examples are re-measured under the 32 MiB cap, and the
test docstrings cite the same figures.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Skip the parts inside a failure report's sample

Once the sample part was taken, walk() still visited its descendants,
and they reached the SMTP TLS and base64 attachment branches: a sample
whose spoofed message carried an SVG or zipped HTML attachment made the
email rejected ("Missing field: 'feedback'", "Unable to parse"), and a
gzipped aggregate report or a tlsrpt+json attachment inside it was
returned as that report instead of the failure report. The sample is
the reported message, so after it is taken every part inside it is
skipped (by the id() of each part its walk() yields). Tests cover SVG,
zipped HTML, JSON, gzipped aggregate XML, tlsrpt+json and PDF
attachments; the failure samples parse to byte-identical output.

The Bug fixes bullet also says that a legacy text part followed by a
feedback-report part with no sample after it is now invalid, with a
test.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Cap SMTP TLS reports and test the format skips

parse_smtp_tls_report_json() decoded and json.loads()-ed a report of
any size; only the gzipped path was capped, and 60 MiB of "[]," cost
+1,565 MiB. It now rejects bytes or text over MAX_DECOMPRESSED_REPORT_SIZE
first, as InvalidSMTPTLSReport, so every report type is held to the cap.

parse_report_file() names the actual reason it skips the email parser
(the leading "<" or "{", or the size cap) rather than a combined one,
and a size message for bytes no longer says "of UTF-8". New tests kill
the mutants the review found surviving: removing the "<" skip for JSON,
narrowing the email skip to "<", the bytes check >= for >, and
removing the SMTP TLS cap.

The constant comment and the changelog state the memory at the cap as
measured on the current code: +345 MiB on the lxml recovery path and
+302 MiB on expat parsing the text directly, +500 MiB and +452 MiB
through parse_report_file(). The changelog says only the exception's
cause changed for files skipped by format, not the message.

Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Skip every sample candidate and correct the stated measurements

sample_parts held only the first sample candidate's parts, so a later
message/rfc822 (or one after a text/rfc822-headers sample) was dropped
as a sample but its parts were still walked, and a gzipped aggregate
report inside it was returned in place of the failure report. Every
candidate's parts are now skipped. Tests cover both shapes, and a test
that a gzipped aggregate report beside the sample is still returned
pins the rule (inside the sample: skipped; beside it: read) and fails
when the set is built from the whole message.

parse_report_file() no longer builds email reasons for content that
begins with "<" or "{", which its message never shows, and the size
reason reads "Invalid report email: the report is larger than 32 MiB".
The memory figures are re-measured in a fresh process with the input
read from disk before the baseline: +399 MiB on the recovery path and
+338 to +355 MiB on expat for the 31 MiB shape, +1,505 MiB for 60 MiB of
JSON before the SMTP TLS cap; the constant comment, the changelog and the
test docstrings state them. RFC 6591 section 3.1 is cited for the sample's
place, and application/json is named among the attachments that made a
failure report invalid.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7
Refs GHSA-q7gm-8cj9-94hr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Scale the timed tests' bounds to the machine running them

The mailsuite fix's first CI run on GitHub's shared runners failed six
timed tests: the suite ran four to six times slower there than on a
workstation, and checks doing real work took longer than their fixed
bounds. Several bounds here have far less margin (0.2 s on a test that
takes 0.18 s whole), so they would fail the same way.

tests/timing.py adds budget(seconds), which measures a fixed reference
parse twice just before the timed call and multiplies the bound by the
slowdown against a reference machine; a faster machine keeps the written
bound. Every timed assert now compares against budget(<written seconds>)
computed before the timer starts. No written bound changed and no assert
was removed.

Refs GHSA-qcc2-4x3v-v4g7

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 14:10:30 -05:00

562 lines
22 KiB
Python

"""Tests for parsedmarc.splunk"""
import json
import time
import traceback
import unittest
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from parsedmarc.splunk import HECClient, SplunkError
from tests.tzutil import force_tz
def _aggregate_report():
return {
"report_metadata": {
"org_name": "TestOrg",
"org_email": "dmarc@example.com",
"report_id": "agg-1",
"begin_date": "2024-01-01 00:00:00",
"end_date": "2024-01-02 00:00:00",
},
"policy_published": {"domain": "example.com", "p": "none"},
"records": [
{
"interval_begin": "2024-01-01 00:00:00",
"interval_end": "2024-01-02 00:00:00",
"normalized_timespan": False,
"source": {
"ip_address": "192.0.2.1",
"country": "US",
"reverse_dns": None,
"base_domain": None,
"name": None,
"type": None,
"asn": 64496,
"as_name": "Example AS",
"as_domain": "example.net",
},
"count": 4,
"alignment": {"spf": True, "dkim": True, "dmarc": True},
"policy_evaluated": {
"disposition": "none",
"dkim": "pass",
"spf": "pass",
"policy_override_reasons": [],
},
"identifiers": {
"header_from": "example.com",
"envelope_from": "example.com",
"envelope_to": None,
},
"auth_results": {
"dkim": [
{
"domain": "example.com",
"selector": "s",
"result": "pass",
"human_result": None,
}
],
"spf": [
{
"domain": "example.com",
"scope": "mfrom",
"result": "pass",
"human_result": None,
}
],
},
}
],
}
def _failure_report():
return {
"feedback_type": "auth-failure",
"user_agent": "test/1.0",
"version": "1",
"original_envelope_id": None,
"original_mail_from": "x@example.com",
"original_rcpt_to": None,
"arrival_date": "Thu, 1 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000",
"arrival_date_utc": "2024-01-01 00:00:00",
"authentication_results": None,
"delivery_result": "other",
"auth_failure": ["dmarc"],
"authentication_mechanisms": [],
"dkim_domain": None,
"reported_domain": "example.com",
"sample_headers_only": True,
"source": {
"ip_address": "192.0.2.5",
"country": "US",
"reverse_dns": None,
"base_domain": None,
"name": None,
"type": None,
"asn": 64496,
"as_name": "Example AS",
"as_domain": "example.net",
},
"sample": "...",
"parsed_sample": {"subject": "Test"},
}
def _smtp_tls_report():
return {
"organization_name": "example.com",
"begin_date": "2024-02-03T00:00:00Z",
"end_date": "2024-02-04T00:00:00Z",
"contact_info": "tls@example.com",
"report_id": "tls-1",
"policies": [
{
"policy_domain": "example.com",
"policy_type": "sts",
"successful_session_count": 100,
"failed_session_count": 0,
}
],
}
def _ok_response():
"""Splunk HEC success response shape: {"code": 0, ...}."""
r = MagicMock()
r.json.return_value = {"code": 0, "text": "Success"}
return r
def _client():
return HECClient(
url="https://splunk.example.com:8088",
access_token="abc-token-uuid",
index="dmarc",
)
class TestHECClientInit(unittest.TestCase):
"""The HEC URL is rebuilt from the user-supplied URL into the
/services/collector/event/1.0 endpoint, and the Authorization
header is set to `Splunk <token>`."""
def test_url_rewritten_to_collector_endpoint(self):
"""A user may supply any URL on the Splunk host; the client
rewrites to the documented HEC path."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://splunk.example.com:8088/some/random/path",
access_token="t",
index="dmarc",
)
self.assertEqual(
client.url, "https://splunk.example.com:8088/services/collector/event/1.0"
)
def test_authorization_header_uses_splunk_prefix(self):
client = HECClient(url="https://h:8088", access_token="my-token", index="dmarc")
self.assertEqual(client.session.headers["Authorization"], "Splunk my-token")
def test_user_agent_header_is_set(self):
client = HECClient(url="https://h:8088", access_token="my-token", index="dmarc")
self.assertIn("parsedmarc", client.session.headers["User-Agent"])
def test_token_with_splunk_prefix_is_normalized(self):
"""If a user pastes `Splunk <token>` from the Splunk UI into
config, the constructor strips the prefix so the resulting
Authorization header isn't `Splunk Splunk <token>`."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088",
access_token="Splunk abc-token-uuid",
index="dmarc",
)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, "abc-token-uuid")
def test_token_without_prefix_is_unchanged(self):
"""The lstrip("Splunk ") implementation has character-set
semantics, not prefix semantics — it happens to work for the
UUID-shaped tokens HEC issues (none of S/p/l/u/n/k/space
appear in a UUID's hex character set). A token containing
only hex digits and dashes is unchanged."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088",
access_token="abc-token-uuid",
index="dmarc",
)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, "abc-token-uuid")
def test_common_data_carries_host_source_and_index(self):
"""Splunk events inherit these three top-level fields. A
regression here would mis-route events to the wrong index."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088", access_token="t", index="dmarc", source="my-source"
)
self.assertEqual(client._common_data["index"], "dmarc")
self.assertEqual(client._common_data["source"], "my-source")
# host defaults to socket.getfqdn(); non-empty is enough.
self.assertTrue(client._common_data["host"])
class TestSaveAggregateReportsToSplunk(unittest.TestCase):
"""Each record is emitted as a separate Splunk event, with the
record's interval_begin as the event timestamp, the report's
metadata flattened onto the event, and sourcetype dmarc:aggregate."""
def test_sends_one_event_per_record(self):
"""Two-record report → two newline-separated events in the POST body."""
client = _client()
report = _aggregate_report()
report["records"].append(report["records"][0].copy())
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(report)
body = client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"]
events = [json.loads(line) for line in body.strip().split("\n")]
self.assertEqual(len(events), 2)
for event in events:
self.assertEqual(event["sourcetype"], "dmarc:aggregate")
self.assertEqual(event["index"], "dmarc")
def test_event_payload_carries_source_metadata(self):
"""The flattened event includes source attribution fields a
Splunk dashboard would filter on."""
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
body = client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"]
event = json.loads(body.strip())["event"]
self.assertEqual(event["source_ip_address"], "192.0.2.1")
self.assertEqual(event["header_from"], "example.com")
self.assertEqual(event["message_count"], 4)
self.assertEqual(event["passed_dmarc"], True)
self.assertEqual(event["org_name"], "TestOrg")
def test_event_includes_published_policy(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
event = json.loads(client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"].strip())[
"event"
]
self.assertEqual(
event["published_policy"], {"domain": "example.com", "p": "none"}
)
def test_dict_input_normalized_to_list(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
client.session.post.assert_called_once()
def test_empty_list_is_a_noop(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk([])
client.session.post.assert_not_called()
def test_post_uses_session_timeout(self):
"""httpx has no per-request verify= kwarg — verification is set
at client construction (see test_client_constructed_with_verify_
false below), so only the per-request timeout is asserted here."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088",
access_token="t",
index="dmarc",
verify=False,
timeout=15,
)
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
kwargs = client.session.post.call_args.kwargs
self.assertNotIn("verify", kwargs)
self.assertEqual(kwargs["timeout"], 15)
def test_client_constructed_with_verify_false(self):
"""verify=False must disable TLS verification on the underlying
httpx.Client at construction time, since httpx.Client does not
accept a per-request verify= kwarg like requests.Session did.
Mocked at the httpx SDK boundary (httpx.Client itself)."""
with patch("parsedmarc.splunk.httpx.Client") as mock_client_cls:
HECClient(
url="https://h:8088",
access_token="t",
index="dmarc",
verify=False,
timeout=15,
)
_, kwargs = mock_client_cls.call_args
self.assertEqual(kwargs["verify"], False)
def test_non_zero_response_code_raises_splunk_error(self):
"""HEC returns code=0 on success and non-zero codes for
token/index/format errors. The error text from HEC carries
the diagnosis and is propagated."""
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
bad = MagicMock()
bad.json.return_value = {"code": 4, "text": "Invalid token"}
client.session.post.return_value = bad
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError) as ctx:
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
self.assertIn("Invalid token", str(ctx.exception))
def test_post_exception_translates_to_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.side_effect = OSError("network")
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError) as ctx:
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
self.assertIn("network", str(ctx.exception))
@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(time, "tzset"), "requires POSIX time.tzset()")
def test_event_time_treats_interval_begin_as_utc(self):
"""interval_begin is a UTC wall-clock string; the HEC event
`time` must be its true UTC epoch regardless of the host
timezone. Regression test for
https://github.com/domainaware/parsedmarc/issues/819: the naive
parse used to shift the epoch by the host's UTC offset."""
force_tz(self)
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
event_wrapper = json.loads(
client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"].strip()
)
self.assertEqual(event_wrapper["time"], 1704067200)
class TestSaveFailureReportsToSplunk(unittest.TestCase):
def test_sends_one_event_per_report(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk([_failure_report(), _failure_report()])
events = [
json.loads(line)
for line in client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"]
.strip()
.split("\n")
]
self.assertEqual(len(events), 2)
for event in events:
self.assertEqual(event["sourcetype"], "dmarc:failure")
def test_event_payload_is_the_report_dict(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk(_failure_report())
event = json.loads(client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"].strip())[
"event"
]
self.assertEqual(event["reported_domain"], "example.com")
def test_empty_list_is_a_noop(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk([])
client.session.post.assert_not_called()
@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(time, "tzset"), "requires POSIX time.tzset()")
def test_event_time_treats_arrival_date_utc_as_utc(self):
"""arrival_date_utc is a UTC wall-clock string; the HEC event
`time` must be its true UTC epoch regardless of the host
timezone. Regression test for
https://github.com/domainaware/parsedmarc/issues/811 (bug 1):
the naive parse used to shift the epoch by the host's UTC
offset (-3600 s under Europe/Warsaw in January)."""
force_tz(self)
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk(_failure_report())
event = json.loads(client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"].strip())
# Fixture arrival_date_utc is 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC.
self.assertEqual(event["time"], 1704067200)
def test_non_zero_response_code_raises_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
bad = MagicMock()
bad.json.return_value = {"code": 6, "text": "Invalid data format"}
client.session.post.return_value = bad
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError):
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk(_failure_report())
def test_post_exception_translates_to_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.side_effect = RuntimeError("conn refused")
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError):
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk(_failure_report())
def test_verify_false_logs_skip_message(self):
"""verify=False should leave a debug breadcrumb so operators
can spot misconfigured TLS in their logs."""
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088", access_token="t", index="dmarc", verify=False
)
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
with self.assertLogs("parsedmarc.log", level="DEBUG") as cm:
client.save_failure_reports_to_splunk(_failure_report())
self.assertTrue(
any("Skipping certificate verification" in m for m in cm.output)
)
class TestSaveSmtpTlsReportsToSplunk(unittest.TestCase):
def test_sends_one_event_per_report(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk([_smtp_tls_report()])
events = [
json.loads(line)
for line in client.session.post.call_args.kwargs["content"]
.strip()
.split("\n")
]
self.assertEqual(len(events), 1)
self.assertEqual(events[0]["sourcetype"], "smtp:tls")
def test_dict_input_normalized_to_list(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk(_smtp_tls_report())
client.session.post.assert_called_once()
def test_empty_list_is_a_noop(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk([])
client.session.post.assert_not_called()
def test_non_zero_response_code_raises_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
bad = MagicMock()
bad.json.return_value = {"code": 7, "text": "Incorrect index"}
client.session.post.return_value = bad
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError):
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk(_smtp_tls_report())
def test_post_exception_translates_to_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.side_effect = RuntimeError("conn refused")
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError):
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk(_smtp_tls_report())
def test_verify_false_logs_skip_message(self):
client = HECClient(
url="https://h:8088", access_token="t", index="dmarc", verify=False
)
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
with self.assertLogs("parsedmarc.log", level="DEBUG") as cm:
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk(_smtp_tls_report())
self.assertTrue(
any("Skipping certificate verification" in m for m in cm.output)
)
class TestInvalidUrlDoesNotLeakPassword(unittest.TestCase):
"""GHSA-hjr3-rx4c-24cv: a password with an unencoded "/", "?" or "#"
ends the URL's authority early (RFC 3986 section 3.2), so httpx reads the
text after the colon as the port and raises
``InvalidURL("Invalid port: 'p4ssw0rd'")`` when posting (httpx 0.28.1
_urlparse.py: ``raise InvalidURL(f"Invalid port: {port!r}")``), before
any network I/O. The error reaches the log on every batch."""
MALFORMED = (
("https://admin:p4ssw0rd/extra@splunk.example.com:8088", "p4ssw0rd"),
("https://admin:p4ss?w0rd@splunk.example.com:8088", "p4ss"),
("https://admin:p4ss#w0rd@splunk.example.com:8088", "p4ss"),
)
def test_invalid_url_raises_fixed_message_without_password(self):
saves = (
("aggregate", "save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk", _aggregate_report),
("failure", "save_failure_reports_to_splunk", _failure_report),
("smtp_tls", "save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk", _smtp_tls_report),
)
for url, secret in self.MALFORMED:
client = HECClient(url=url, access_token="tok", index="dmarc")
for name, method, make_report in saves:
with self.subTest(url=url, report=name):
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError) as ctx:
getattr(client, method)(make_report())
self.assertEqual(
str(ctx.exception),
"Invalid Splunk HEC URL (details withheld because they "
"may include credentials)",
)
self.assertIsNone(ctx.exception.__cause__)
self.assertTrue(ctx.exception.__suppress_context__)
trace = "".join(traceback.format_exception(ctx.exception))
self.assertNotIn(secret, trace)
def test_valid_url_is_the_one_posted(self):
client = HECClient(
url="https://admin:p4ssw0rd@splunk.example.com:8088",
access_token="tok",
index="dmarc",
)
client.session = MagicMock()
client.session.post.return_value = _ok_response()
client.save_aggregate_reports_to_splunk(_aggregate_report())
self.assertEqual(
client.session.post.call_args.args[0],
"https://admin:p4ssw0rd@splunk.example.com:8088"
"/services/collector/event/1.0",
)
class TestHECClientClose(unittest.TestCase):
def test_close_closes_session(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
client.close()
client.session.close.assert_called_once()
class TestSplunkBackwardCompatAlias(unittest.TestCase):
def test_forensic_alias_points_to_failure_method(self):
self.assertIs(
HECClient.save_forensic_reports_to_splunk,
HECClient.save_failure_reports_to_splunk,
)
class TestSmtpTlsTimestampErrorIsSplunkError(unittest.TestCase):
"""GHSA-4272-4r8g-6c5h: the SMTP TLS save converted ``begin_date``
outside its ``try``, so a wrong-typed date (``"start-datetime": 5`` in
the report) raised a bare ``AttributeError`` that the CLI did not catch.
Parsing now rejects such a report; the save still raises
``SplunkError`` for a value that does not convert."""
def test_unconvertible_begin_date_raises_splunk_error(self):
client = _client()
client.session = MagicMock()
for begin_date in (5, "not a date"):
report = _smtp_tls_report()
report["begin_date"] = begin_date
with self.subTest(begin_date=begin_date):
with self.assertRaises(SplunkError):
client.save_smtp_tls_reports_to_splunk([report])
client.session.post.assert_not_called()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main(verbosity=2)